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Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor
of Carbon Tax with Reinvestment to Reduce
Global Emissions
Stephen Sewalk*
Abstract
It is time for the European Union to dump the EU-ETS cap-andtrade system, as it is not working. By adopting a carbon tax with
reinvestment, the European Union (EU) could reduce its economy-wide
emissions by forty-eight percent (and emissions from buildings and utilities
by sixty-five percent) within twenty years while automatically putting in
place a border tax adjustment. By adopting the carbon tax with
reinvestment, the EU's trading partners would be heavily encouraged to
adopt the same system, thereby dramatically reducing global emissions.
This adoption would occur much like the EU adopting the Value-Added Tax
and 150 countries following within a short time after. The impacts would be
dramatic, from potentially reducing emissions in the United States by fortynine percent and emissions from building and utilities by sixty-seven
percent over twenty years to China actually reducing its emissions over the
next twenty years by a nineteen percent reduction in emissions for buildings
and utilities, and a thirteen percent economy-wide reduction instead of
almost doubling them. This system would also encourage countries such as
Brazil and Malaysia to stop deforesting or else lose access to the world's
largest markets for their exports.
The EU countries would utilize the proceeds from the tax, once
collected, to rebuild the electric power grid in order to significantly reduce
carbon emissions. The structure thereby creates both a penalty for states
that emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases and an incentive for
states to significantly change their emissions profile by investing in clean
hybrid energy resources.
The EU once again has an opportunity to lead the world in climate
change mitigation by adopting a tax that will fund the replacement of its
current energy infrastructure, not only reducing emissions, but also
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increasing the region’s energy security and reducing its reliance on
unreliable energy suppliers.
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I. Introduction
A. Global Climate Change Implications
Global climate change has the potential to alter the landscape and
characteristics of planet Earth as we know it.1 The twelve warmest years in
recorded history have all occurred in the past fifteen years, the oceanic
temperature has recently reached record highs, and ice in the Arctic is
melting faster than most models predicted.2 A recent NASA-led study
covering a fifty-year period discovered that higher temperatures are causing
tropical forests to absorb less and less carbon dioxide every year.3 Climate
scientists have successfully provided analyses that yield “very high”
confidence in attributing the bulk of the past fifty years’ rise in global
temperature to human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG)4 emissions.5 Some
1.
See generally THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010 (2010),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/52876781226014527953/WDR10-Full-Text.pdf (discussing the effect that climate change will have
on the planet and the need for mitigation efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS
REPORT] (synthesizing the scientific evidence of global climate change and discussing the
effect that it will have on human populations) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also Stephen Sewalk, Project
Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, 3 THE ENGINEERING PROJECT ORG. J. 141, 142
(2012) (collecting research cataloguing the “irreversible processes” which may result from
continued climate change, including ocean warming, loss of forests, and coastal flooding).
2.
See generally IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1; see also President Barack
Obama, ‘We Need to Act,’ Transcript of Obama’s Climate Change Speech, BLOOMBERG
(2013),
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/-we-need-to-acttranscript-of-obama-s-climate-change-speech.html (showing the President categorizing these
climatic changes as scientific “facts”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
3.
See Weile Wang et al., Variations in Atmospheric CO2 Growth Rates Coupled
With Tropical Temperatures, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 13061, 13061
(2013) (noting that this finding represents a “diagnostic tool for improved understanding of
the contemporary and future global carbon cycle”).
4.
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1.5, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-381771 U.N.T.S. 107 (defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous
constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit
infrared radiation”); see also David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX
J. 2063, 2065 (2003) (explaining that different gases have different effects on global
warming, so emissions are standardized to CO2 equivalents when measuring effects on
global warming).
5.
See Camille Parmesan et al., Beyond Climate Change Attribution in Conservation
and Ecological Research, 16 ECOLOGY LETTERS 58, 69 (2013) (showing that global metaanalysis provides the “most reliable, scientifically defensible and robust” approach to detect
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climate scientists believe that Earth has already been irrevocably damaged
by excess carbon emissions, effectively changing the atmospheric
composition of our planet.6 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), fossil fuel consumption accounts for the majority
of anthropogenic GHG emissions.7 Many of the natural resources that have
nurtured our survival and growth as a species—and represent the livelihood
for entire industries and populations—are in peril.8 Efforts to make the
general populace aware of GHG emissions are leading to an outcry for
countries to address their carbon emissions.9 Without legislation to
drastically curb the amount of GHG emitted into the atmosphere, the future
of the earth’s habitable environments may be irrevocably altered, and we
may be jeopardizing the future of our own species.10
These uncontrolled, rapid increases in GHG emissions create a
significant risk of further adverse impacts to the environment, potentially
resulting in irreversible changes.11 Global climate change could lead to
melting snowcaps and glaciers, rising sea levels, and changing weather
patterns (resulting in flooding and draughts).12 Since 1880, it is estimated
that the sea level has risen approximately eight inches due to global
long-term global climate change, strongly evidencing the anthropogenic contributions to
climate change).
6.
See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationary is Dead” Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 27 (2010)
(outlining the positive feedback loop which results in higher atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases).
7.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION SUMMARY FOR POLICY
MAKERS 7 (2011), available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_SPM.pdf
(showing that, in 2004, 56.6% of CO2 from fossil fuels was the highest single emission
comprising the GHG composition) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
8.
See Ove Hoegh-Guldberg & John F. Bruno, The Impact of Climate Change on the
World’s Marine Ecosystems, 328 SCIENCE 1523, 1523 (2010) (providing the example of
rapidly changing marine ecosystems, threatening populations and industries given the
“overwhelming importance of the ocean to life on our planet”).
9.
See Terry Townshend & Sam Fankhauser, How National Legislation Can Help to
Solve Climate Change, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 430, 430 (2013) (noting that the
stagnation of international climate negotiations has increased the passage of national
legislation on climate across the globe).
10.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 141–42 (listing human health effects including
substantial increases in malnutrition and cardio-respiratory diseases).
11.
See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (arguing for mitigation of
GHG emissions due to “inertia in the climate system, meaning that warming and its
impacts . . . are to a considerable extent irreversible”).
12.
See Brian C. Murray & Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap and Trade, and
the Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 699 (2009) (showing that
significant climate and weather impacts have occurred around the globe in nearly every
ecosystem).
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warming.13 Scientists estimate an additional twenty- to eighty-inch rise in
sea level is possible during this century.14 In the United Kingdom (U.K.)
alone, as many as 490,000 properties are at risk of flooding due to rising sea
levels; the risk of rising sea levels affects all countries with ocean
shorelines.15 In the U.S., approximately five million people live in 2.6
million homes that are less than four feet above high tide.16 Climate change
will affect infrastructure, agriculture, and lifestyle, potentially leading to
decreasing standards of living, especially in communities that have
economies sensitive to variations in climate.17 This includes many of
developing countries that have primarily agricultural economies.18
B. Responses to Climate Change
In response to this increasingly pressing situation, many nations
have sought to implement climate change legislation that will lead to lower
GHG emissions.19 Many proposals for regulation of GHG emissions,
however, have failed to persuade legislatures to embrace holistic climate

13.
See BEN STRAUSS, CLAUDIA TEBALDI & REMIK ZIEMLINSKI, SURGING SEAS: A
CLIMATE
CENTRAL
REPORT
2
(2012),
available
at
http://slr.s3.amazonaws.com/SurgingSeas.pdf [hereinafter SURGING SEAS] (adding that the
rate of sea level rise is accelerating and some scientists estimate another twenty to eighty
inches of sea level rise by the end of the century) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
14.
See id. (explaining the relationship between a rising sea level and the increased
probability of dangerous floods due to storm surges).
15.
See Climate Change Explained, ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/climatechange/31802.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013)
(“Small island states, including 15 nations found in the Pacific, may face the most dire and
immediate consequences.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
16.
See SURGING SEAS, supra note 13, at 2 (“In 285 cities and towns, more than half
the population lives on land below this line, potential victims of increasingly likely climateinduced coastal flooding.”).
17.
See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (2010) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (providing
examples of flooding coastal regions, contaminated freshwater sources, and exacerbated
droughts in equatorial regions leading to decreased food security and malnourishment).
18.
See id. (citing drought conditions and supplies of freshwater as the reason for this
correlation).
19.
See Nate Loewentheil, Of Stasis and Movements: Climate Legislation in the 111th
Congress 5–6 (Yale Univ. Inst. For Soc. & Pol’y Stud. Working Paper No. ISPS12-020,
2013) (discussing attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass climate change legislation) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see
also Townshend & Fankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (highlighting “nearly 300 pieces of
climate change legislation or regulations of similar importance in . . . 33 countries”).

360

5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 355 (2014)

change reform.20 Nations may be waiting to see a well-implemented,
efficient policy up and running in another nation before they attempt to
adopt mitigation legislation for themselves.21 This reluctance on the part of
lawmakers around the globe can be attributed to a number of factors,
including a fear of harming domestic business, a lack of confidence in
proposed climate change schemes, and the continued skepticism of certain
groups about the serious consequences of carbon emissions in the
atmosphere.22
1. China
China has experienced astounding economic growth in the past
thirty years, which has both greatly increased the country’s GDP, and
inundated the nation with environmental problems stemming from that
rapid development.23 Consequently, economic losses due to environmental
degradation and pollution account for roughly ten percent of China’s gross
national income.24 China is now the largest national emitter of CO2 in the

20.
See Townshend & Frankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (noting that the “number of
laws is not a perfect indicator of a country’s response to climate change”).
21.
See id. (adding that some nations choose to pass laws related to disaster
management before making the leap to climate change mitigation, showing the “close link
between adaptation to climate change and the management of normal climate variability”).
22.
See Andrew J. Hoffman, Talking Past Each Other? Cultural Framing of Skeptical
and Convinced Logistics in the Climate Change Debate, 24 ORG. & ENVT. 3, 4 (2011)
(analyzing the social science research done to show the existence of “climate skeptics” and
the effect of these groups on collective political action).
23.
JUNJIE ZHANG, ASIA SOCIETY POL’Y INST., DELIVERING ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF CHINA 2 (2012) (“China has achieved
miraculous economic growth over the past 30 years . . . . However, growing the gross
domestic product (GDP) at any cost has created a series of social and environmental
problems.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
24.
See id. (asserting that China’s attempt to grow its economy “at any cost” created a
series of social and environmental problems).
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world.25 However, China’s role in remedying its high levels of emissions is
somewhat undefined.26
China is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol,27 an international treaty
that addresses GHG emissions and anthropomorphic climate change;
however, the nation is exempt from the emissions lowering benchmarks
proposed in the agreement.28 Accordingly, even though China has failed to
meet any of the emission reductions called for by the international
agreement, it has seen no negative repercussions.29 In 2008, China initiated
a carbon-trading scheme that operates to lower GHG emissions through a
voluntary carbon market.30 A number of private companies manage this
carbon-trading scheme; however, the Chinese government appears to be
supporting the carbon markets, as are local governmental entities
throughout China.31 Despite the top-down approach, the government has no
plans to establish a unified trading system for the country and seems
satisfied to allow domestic emitters to create their own carbon markets.32
2. Other Developing Countries
In general, developed countries are quite concerned that heavy
restrictions on carbon emissions will apply only to domestic producers and

25.
See International Energy Statistics: Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the
Consumption of Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: INDEPENDENT STATISTICS & ANALYSIS,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90 &pid=44&aid=8 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter International Energy Statistics] (noting that China emitted over
8.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2011) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also ZHANG, supra note 23, at
5–6 (noting that the major contributors to CO2 emissions are increased urbanization and new
transportation systems, coal mining and combustion for increased energy demands, and
rapid industrial development resulting in resource depletion and environmental pollution).
26.
See ZHANG, supra note 23, at 7 (adding that energy use and GHG emissions in
China will continue to rise as income increases).
27.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
28.
See ZHANG, supra note 23, at 19 (“Because of the principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility,’ China is not subject to the quantified emissions limitation and
reduction commitment in the Kyoto Protocol.”).
29.
See id. (discussing a lack of “meaningful participation” on the part of China).
30.
See Yitian Huang, Policy Experimentation and Emergence of Domestic Voluntary
Carbon Trading in China, 30 EAST ASIA 67, 68 (2013) (highlighting three voluntary
exchanges in China allowing sellers and buyers to trade carbon credits).
31.
See id. at 80 (“[T]he Chinese central government provides general support for
voluntary carbon trading, with local governments being crucial to the proliferation of statecontrolled exchanges.”).
32.
See id. at 80–81 (noting that this non-unified system allows for domestic players to
experiment with various scales and structures for provincial exchanges).
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not imports, leading to carbon leakage.33 Carbon leakage occurs when a
developed country threatens or puts into effect restrictions on carbon
emissions (cap-and-trade, for example) and subsequently emissiondependent industries relocate to developing countries with no emissions
restrictions.34 Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that this occurred during
the 1990s and 2000s.35 The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992,
which led to the Kyoto Protocol, called upon developed countries to reduce
GHG emissions.36 Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing
countries with no emissions objectives or restrictions boomed following
these announcements leading to rapidly rising emissions in developing
countries.37 It appears that developed countries promising or actually
capping emissions resulted in significant FDI into developing countries,
allowing “nations to benefit from the omission to internalize environmental
negativities could be both environmentally and economically counterproductive . . . if mobile taxpaying industries relocate to pollution haven
countries that offer little environmental regulation.”38 A significant amount
of this FDI investment was directed to the “BRIC” nations.39 In addition,
the indirect consequence of Rio and Kyoto may have been to increase
global emissions.40
This FDI not only propelled domestic growth, but also in many
cases encouraged the development of trade globally to take advantage of
cheap labor and non-existent or rarely-enforced environmental
33.
See Glen P. Peters & Edgar G. Hertwich, Trading Kyoto, 2 NATURE REP. 40, 40
(2008) (discussing hypothetical examples of carbon emissions from producers, often located
in developing nations not restricted by the emissions standards of the Kyoto Protocol).
34.
See id. at 41 (noting that the IPCC’s definition of carbon leakage only considers
leakage resulting from the Kyoto Protocol whereas in reality, the growth in China
contributes a non-negligible amount to the problem).
35.
See id. (explaining the reasons for increased emissions in developing countries).
36.
See James D. Desmond, The Earth Summit and Limits on Carbon Dioxide
Emissions: Reading Between the Lines, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 357, 357 (1993)
(showing that participants at the Summit proposed that “industrialized nations stabilize their
carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000”).
37.
See id. at 365 (arguing that “by the year 2025 developing countries will be
responsible for nearly 50% of the world’s carbon dioxide output”).
38.
John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax
Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 149, 157–58 (2010).
39.
See JIM O’NEIL, GOLDMAN SACHS, BUILDING BETTER ECONOMIC BRICS (2001),
available at http://www.content.gs.com/japan/ideas/brics/building-better-pdf.pdf (defining
BRICs as a term coined by Goldman Sachs to represent the largest and quickest growing
developing countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
40.
See Peters & Hertwich, supra note 33, at 40 (pointing to Kyoto’s exemption of
developing nations as the source of carbon leakage and, therefore, increased carbon
emissions globally).
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regulations.41 This is why China has attempted to shift the blame of its
emissions to importers of its goods, blaming fifteen percent of its emissions
on exports to western countries,42 a situation not anticipated by Kyoto.43
Even though the European Union (the “EU”) and the U.S. have minimized
increases in their emissions levels since 2000, based on emissions
intensities (GDP/total GHG emissions) of imports versus exports, total
emissions including imports have skyrocketed.44 Meanwhile, countries such
as Brazil and Malaysia continue to contribute to global emissions by cutting
down their forests.45 These concerns led to U.S. legislation (WaxmanMarkey bill) that proposed a carbon tax on imports for countries that do not
internalize the cost of emissions.46 In addition, this is why the EU has
41.
See GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL ON GLOBAL TRADE AND FDI, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AS A KEY DRIVER FOR TRADE, GROWTH AND PROSPERITY: THE CASE FOR A
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 7 (2013) (explaining how FDI drove trade in
sub-Saharan Africa).
42.
See Duncan Clark, West Blamed for Rapid Increase in China’s CO2, THE
GUARDIAN, (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/feb/23/chinaco2-emissions-climate (discussing China’s deflection of blame for its CO2 emissions) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
43.
See Peters & Hertwich, supra note 33, at 40 (describing the unanticipated
consequences of Kyoto).
44.
See Press Release, European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Growing Faster Since 2000: New Data on Worldwide Emissions 1970–2005
(May
25,
2009),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_090525_newsrelease_edgar.pdf (noting a fifteen
percent increase in emissions between the years 2000 and 2005) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). This is
primarily due to carbon leakage of industry moving from the U.S., EU, and Japan to China,
which has possibly had the unintended result of increasing global emissions by moving
production from low emission intensity countries to high emission intensity countries. See
Truby, supra note 38, at 157–58 (explaining that relocation of industries to pollution-haven
countries could even increase pollution levels).
45.
See Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, WORLD
WILDLIFE
FOUNDATION,
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/forest_climate2
/forests_and_climate_change/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (explaining that twenty percent of
global emissions come from deforestation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). A carbon tax policy needs to take this source
into account, thereby discouraging Brazil and Malaysia from cutting down their forests. See
Michael Obersteiner, et al., Economics of Avoiding Deforestation 2 (Oct. 16, 2006)
(presented at Climate Mitigation Measures in the Agro-Forestry Sector and Biodiversity
Futures, International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy, Oct. 16–17, 2006),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.168.1653&rep=rep1&type=pdf
(explaining that a carbon tax of nine U.S. dollars per ton of carbon could reduce
deforestation by half) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
46.
See generally Analysis of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act,
NRDC LEGISLATIVE FACTS (Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C.), Sept.
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attempted to impose a carbon tax on airlines flying into the EU.47
Developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU member-states, are
concerned that unless imports are included in emissions restrictions, many
industries beneficial to their economies will relocate to avoid internalizing
the cost of their emissions.48 This difference between Annex I and II
countries convinced the U.S. to not sign the treaty, as the U.S. noted that
developing countries, such as China, would not be subject to emissions
limits, and American industry would be unfairly burdened, resulting in
companies’ relocation to countries with no emissions limits.49
3. The United States
The second highest emitter of carbon dioxide is the U.S.50 Similar
to China’s involvement in the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. signed the
agreement but did not ratify it, and has therefore been exempt from the
emission regulation benchmarks.51 The U.S., due in large part to the
economic recession, however, was able to reduce its CO2 emissions level
below the Kyoto Protocol benchmark.52 Despite this encouraging trend, the
U.S. has never adopted any form of GHG emission reducing legislation.53
2009, available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/files/ACESLegFS.pdf (delineating
the basic provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
47.
See EU Ready to Compromise Over Airline Carbon Tax: EU Sources,
EUBUSINESS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/transport-aviation.qdb
(explaining that the EU was willing to compromise on the attempt to tax airlines in exchange
for action from other leading countries) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
48.
See Don C. Brunell, U.S. Regulators Shipping Jobs Overseas, WASHINGTON
BUSINESS MAGAZINE, Fall 2013 (arguing that U.S. jobs and environmental protections will
be lost as companies shift production to facilities in countries with less strict emissions
standards) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
49.
See JANE A. LEGGET ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34659, CHINA’S
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION POLICIES 25 (Sept. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34659.pdf (describing China as a non-Annex I country
and stating that it therefore did not have binding emissions limits from 2008 until 2012).
50.
See International Energy Statistics, supra note 25, at 44–57 (listing carbon
emissions data from all countries).
51.
See Jon Havi, Detlef Sprinz & Guri Bang, Why the United States Did Not Become
a Party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and U.S. Perspectives, 18 EURO. J.
INT’L RELATIONS 130, 133 (2012) (explaining that the United States did not become a party
to the protocol after the Senate failed to ratify the Protocol and after President Bush’s
repudiation of it).
52.
See Allan LeBlanc, Is The U.S. About to Accidently Meet the Kyoto Protocol
Targets?, BERKELEY ENERGY & RES. COLLAB. (Sept. 4, 2012), http://berc.berkeley.edu/isthe-us-about-to-accidentally-meet-kyoto-protocol-targets/ (stating that the United States,
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Cap-and-trade programs are often the leading proposals when governments
look to limit GHG emissions, and the United States has entertained the idea
of a cap-and-trade system.54 The American Clean Energy and Security Act,
also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, was the most recent cap-and-trade
proposal.55 The bill, designed to lower carbon emissions and create clean
energy jobs, was approved by the House of Representatives, but was voted
down in the Senate in 2009.56 The United States Congress has yet to pass
any legislation that would mitigate carbon emissions.57
During his June 2013 environmental policy speech, President
Obama outlined a series of initiatives that would continue to move the U.S.
closer to implementing a holistic market-based climate change policy.58 The
President vowed his administration’s continued support to lower GHG
emissions below 2005 levels by seventeen percent.59 He also announced a
series of new federal measures to reduce the nation’s impact on global
climate change.60 These new initiatives include allowing the EPA to
complete pollution standards for new and existing power plants, directing
the Interior Department to allow public lands to be reserved for new
renewable energy facilities to be built, increasing the federal government’s
exclusive use of renewable sources of energy, and encouraging negotiations
with other nations to allow free trade of environmental goods and
services.61 President Obama also encouraged lawmakers to work together to

though late, has reached emissions levels below the 1990 levels required by the Kyoto
Protocol) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
53.
See Michael Wines, E.P.A. Is Expected to Set Limits on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions by New Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at A12 (stating that the EPA
was taking its first-ever steps to reduce GHGs from new power plants).
54.
See Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG.,
Aug. 2009 (explaining the development of the United States’ proposals for cap-and-trade
systems).
55.
See generally Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 46 (noting that the
legislation was passed by the House of Representatives in 2009).
56.
See H.R. 2454 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, OPEN CONG.,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited May 5, 2014)
(providing the U.S. House of Representatives votes for and against the bill) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
57.
See Townshend & Frankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (stating that the United States
has failed to pass legislation and instead attempts to regulate under the guise of the Clean Air
Act).
58.
See President Obama, supra note 2 (advocating for a bi-partisan, market-based
solution to climate change).
59.
See id. (addressing the goal that the President established the year he took office).
60.
See id. (directing agencies like the EPA to develop standards to mitigate
emissions).
61.
See id. (outlining specific suggestions for agency action).
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create a market-based GHG emission reduction system that the U.S. could
implement in the near future.62
4. The European Union
This uncertainty among legislatures around the world will likely
only be exacerbated by the recent news that Europe’s flagship climate
change initiative, the European Union’s Environmental Trading System
(EU-ETS), has failed to live up to its potential.63 The program has been
mired in economic inefficiency and plagued by unrealized environmental
goals since its inception in 2005.64 The EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade program
designed to restrict carbon dioxide emissions in certain industries
throughout much of Europe.65 These industries include refineries,
combustion-related facilities, iron and steel factories, cement plants, and
electricity providers.66 The goal of the cap-and-trade program was to create
and maintain a market for carbon that would encourage investment into
new low-emission technologies.67 The legislation was hailed as a huge
victory for proponents of climate change mitigation when it was
implemented, and the world waited to see if the first large emissions trading
scheme would prove successful.68 Unfortunately, eight years into the
program, many Members of European Parliament (MEPs) appear ready to
62.
See id. (stating that the President would be willing to work with both Democrats
and Republicans to enact legislation and regulations to mitigate the impact of emissions).
63.
See RICARDO COELHO, TAMRA GILBERA & JOANNA CABELLO, CARBON TRADE
WATCH, GREEN IS THE COLOR OF MONEY: THE EU ETS FAILED MODEL FOR THE “GREEN
ECONOMY” 2 (2013) available at http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/p
ublications/EU-ETS_Report-web.pdf (explaining that the EU-ETS has failed to meet its
objectives) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
64.
See Anna Petherick, Holding Out Hope, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 534, 534–35
(2013) (discussing the difficulties the EU-ETS program).
65.
See COELHO ET AL., supra note 63, at 3 (explaining the EU-ETS cap-and-trade
model).
66.
See generally Julien Chevallier, Banking and Borrowing in the EU ETS: A Review
of Economic Modelling, Current Provisions and Prospects for Future Design, 26 J. ECON.
SURVEYS 158 (2012) (describing the types of facilities affected by the EU-ETS).
67.
See A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 35 (2008),
available
at
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf
(describing the goal of creating a marketplace that would facilitate cuts in emissions to meet
the Kyoto Protocol requirements) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
68.
See Helena Spongenberg, EU’s Carbon Trading Scheme Hailed as Success,
EUOBSERVER (May 29, 2007, 9:17 AM), http://euobserver.com/economic/24145 (noting that
the EU-ETS was seen as a remarkable success despite challenges and concerns) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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abandon the EU-ETS.69 On April 16, 2003, the European Parliament
rejected a measure that would have back-loaded future carbon emissions
allowances, a measure that some say could have bolstered the faltering
program.70 Because of the vote, the program’s carbon market price for
allowances fell to new lows.71
Part II of this article analyzes the EU-ETS system of carbon
regulation using the cap-and-trade system to determine why it has not
produced the results the EU expected. Part III provides an alternative
approach to climate change legislation by discussing a carbon tax approach.
Part IV details the benefits and results of a modified carbon taxation
program that incorporates reinvestment. Part V summarizes why the EU
should abandon the ETS in favor of a carbon tax with reinvestment.
II. EU-ETS (Cap-and-Trade)
A. What is Cap-and-Trade?
In a cap-and-trade program, a legislative body appoints a
governmental agency to establish a maximum amount, or cap, on carbon
emissions from certain carbon polluting parties.72 These selected carbon
polluters are then required to lower their GHG emissions below the cap.73
To encourage compliance and minimize initial costs, these parties are given
allowances to emit carbon, and should they fall below their cap, they can
trade or sell these allowances to others.74 Those who are not able to limit
their GHG emissions under the cap are then able to purchase these leftover
allowances.75 In this manner, the cap-and-trade system creates a market
among carbon polluters, and the availability and demand in trading for the
allowances dictates their value and price of emissions—in this case, CO2—
by the ton.76 The cap-and-trade system is designed to reduce GHG
emissions by making it more economically viable for carbon polluters to
develop and invest in new processes to mitigate or collect emissions, move
69.
See ETS RIP?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013 (“It [the ETS] may well become an
example of what not to do . . . .”).
70.
See id. (stating that the EU vote was 334 in favor of rejecting the proposal, to 315
against rejecting the proposal).
71.
See id. (explaining the effect of the vote rejecting the proposal).
72.
See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of Allowance Allocations on
Cap-and-Trade System Performance, 54 J.L. & ECON. S267, S270 (2011) (explaining that the
government sets the overall emissions cap and can determine which firms are exempt).
73.
See id. at S268 (describing how cap-and-trade systems function).
74.
See id. at S270 (explaining the system of credit allocation).
75.
See id. (explaining the options given to firms who exceed the cap).
76.
See id. (describing the impact of the cap and trade system on market prices).
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toward cleaner forms of energy and encourage consumers to use energy
more efficiently due to rising costs.77
1. Advantages of Cap-and-Trade
There are a number of unique advantages to a cap-and-trade
program that help lower GHG emissions. Politicians often favor this
program because cap-and-trade is not a “tax,” and the government has
control over allocating the emissions allowances.78 Some environmentalists
have rallied behind the cap-and-trade method because it establishes a clear
quantity restriction on carbon polluters.79 In addition, many industry groups
support cap-and-trade programs because of their inherent money-making
potential.80 All supporters of cap-and-trade programs believe two
assumptions about the program: (1) Carbon emissions below a certain level
(that designated by the cap, or its ultimate goal) do not cause undue harm to
the environment, and (2) a market in trading pollution allowances is “the
most cost-effective means of reducing pollution to the predetermined
level . . . .”81

77.
See id. at S276 (finding that lower prices encourage a reliance on energy efficient
emissions technology).
78 .
See Robert Hahn & Robert Stavins, Why Cap-and-Trade Should (and Does) Have
Appeal to Politicians, VOX (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/article/why-cap-andtrade-should-and-does-have-appeal-politicians (“The political appeal of cap-and-trade can be
explained, in part, by the fact that politicians can fiddle with the initial distribution of
property rights . . . without affecting the final equilibrium . . . .”) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
79.
See Robert F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and
Find our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118, 10120 (Feb. 2009)
(discussing politicians’, economists’, and environmentalists’ reasons for favoring a cap-andtrade approach to climate mitigation); see also Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with
Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 587 (2013)
(“Environmentalists favor this system for the absolute quantity restrictions on carbon
emissions.”).
80.
See J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1540–46 (2007) (discussing the reasons
that industry groups and environmentalists both favor a cap and trade system); see also U.S.
CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 6 (2009), available
at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf (advocating for industry groups and
environmentalists to establish a legislative framework to address climate change) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
81.
See Mann, supra note 79, at 10120 (2009) (detailing the assumptions underlining
support for cap-and-trade).
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2. Disadvantages to Cap-and-Trade
There are also disadvantages to approaching the problem of climate
change through a cap and trade system. Determining a baseline amount of
emission reduction targets, the allocation of allowances, and the use of
offsets, often slows down cap-and-trade programs.82 Thus, the period of
adoption of a cap-and-trade program and its implementation is often
lengthy.83 There is also no certainty of the price required to achieve the
promised reduction levels defined by the emissions cap.84 Cap-and-trade
programs require constant monitoring, the balancing of many factors, and
history has shown the U.S. that carbon markets experience volatile, often
unforeseen, price shifts.85 If the price of carbon is too high, there will be
pressure to relax the cap.86 Yet, when the cap is relaxed too much, the
carbon market itself is decimated.87
Perhaps more important than all of the drawbacks elicited above is
the fact that a cap-and-trade system does not guarantee a reduction in GHG
emissions, defeating the purpose of enacting such a scheme. Cap-and-trade
requires certainty about the demand for emissions, and that those
regulations are regulated precisely.88 An effective cap-and-trade program
requires that all emission allowances be auctioned off.89 If, however, there
is any uncertainty in the demand for emissions, or if problems arise while
regulating the emissions permits, the cap-and-trade program becomes
82.
See Edward Nell & Armon Rezai, Economic Growth and Climate Change: Capand-Trade or Emission Tax? 9–11 (Schwartz Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Analysis Working Paper
No. 2009-4, Feb. 2009) (explaining the drawbacks of a cap-and-trade system) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
83.
See id. at 2 (estimating the time required for implementation).
84.
See id. at 11 (“The high volatility on the return, due to the tremendous fluctuations
of the emission price, poses considerable uncertainty for firms in their investment
decisions.”).
85.
See Julien Chevallier et al., Options Introduction and Volatility in the EU ETS, 33
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECON. 855, 873 (2011) (explaining the uncertain nature of
predicting the behavior of carbon markets).
86.
See id. at 863 (“These asymmetries reflect the hedging strategies constructed by
market agents to reduce the risk of their position with regard to high/low carbon price
changes.”).
87.
See id. at 873 (“Because options enable a more complete and liquid market, and a
greater flexibility for market participants to hedge their position on the carbon market, they
seem to have a significant impact on the level of volatility in the futures market.”).
88.
See Philip I. Levy, The Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade Royal Rumble, FOREIGN
POL’Y
(May
13,
2009),
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/13/the
_carbon_taxcap_and_trade_royal_rumble (“Cap-and-trade can do a very good impersonation
of a carbon tax when we know the demand for emissions with certainty, when we do a great
job of regulation, and when we auction off all the emissions permits.”).
89.
See id. (explaining the cap-and-trade auctioning system).
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unstable and unworkable.90 Furthermore, if the dispersal of permits is
obstructed by political interference, the viability of cap-and-trade programs
is further weakened.91
Cap-and-trade programs, while rudimentary on their face, are
somewhat complex in their implementation. They rely on (hopefully)
identifying low carbon technologies for cost management in emissions
reductions.92 The objective is that price signals provided by caps extending
decades into the future will incentivize the development and use of these
low carbon technologies.93 This is a key assumption to the hoped-for lower
future costs of achieving those reductions set by the decreasing cap. Due to
the inherent uncertainty of those ideas, however, supplementary policies are
necessary to assure further governmental funding and increased incentives
for private funding in research and development.94 These policies take the
form of multi-year compliance periods, banking and borrowing provisions,
a cost containment mechanism to prevent extreme pricing, and the
availability of offsets for carbon capture and sequestration.95
The message cap-and-trade programs send to carbon polluters can
also be confusing regarding emissions reduction,96 even though the end goal
of a cap-and-trade program is to reduce GHG emissions.97 These programs
propose to reach that goal by requiring polluters to purchase the right to
pollute or use permits to pollute for free.98 In both instances, the
government in essence gives permission to carbon polluters to continue
90.
See id. (describing the volatile and unreliable nature of the cap-and-trade system
because of their reliance on unpredictable factors).
91.
See id. (“[I]f politics intrudes into the process of handing out emissions permits,
then the two approaches [cap-and-trade and carbon taxes] veer apart.”).
92.
See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 78, at 3 (outlining the underlying principles of a
cap-and-trade system).
93.
See Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S.
Cap-and-Trade System, 24 OXF. REV. ECON. POLICY 298, 299 (2008) (outlining the desired
effect of a successful cap-and-trade system).
94.
See id. at 300 (“[A] cap-and-trade system alone will not encourage the socially
desirable level of investment in research, development, and deployment of new technologies
that could reduce future emission-reduction costs.”).
95.
See id. at 303 (evaluating additional incentive plans to encourage emission
reduction).
96.
See David Driesen, Capping Carbon 36 (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law, Working
Paper No. 31, 2009) (“Trading does not solve any of the key problems hindering effective
cap setting, so while it proves useful in reducing costs, it does nothing to improve on
traditional approaches in solving environmental problems.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
97.
See id. (explaining the desired purpose of the cap-and-trade system).
98.
See Reuven Avi-Yonah & David Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change:
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009) (describing the ambiguous message of cap-and-trade as “the
government permit[ting] you to pollute as long as you are willing to pay”).
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polluting. This “right to pollute” notion that cap-and-trade sends to
polluters, however, may not be in tune with society’s desire to reducing
GHG emissions.99 Even though wording GHG reduction programs as a
“tax” may make the programs less likely to pass through the political
process, the term sends the message that emitting high levels of carbon is
the legislation’s target.
B. The EU-ETS and Why it Has Proven Ineffective
1. Inception of the EU-ETS
The EU-ETS is the largest and most influential GHG emission
reduction program in the world, comprising every nation in the European
Union along with Croatia, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.100 Since its
inception, it has failed to live up to expectations.101 With the European
Parliament rejection of a back-loading attempt to strengthen the faltering
cap-and-trade market for emission allowances, the carbon trading
behemoth’s days may be numbered. With the ever-growing need for
comprehensive carbon emission regulation facing legislatures around the
world, the question becomes, what should we do now? It is crucial to
understand why the EU-ETS is failing, and what changes must be adopted
in order to avoid making the same mistakes again.
The EU-ETS came from very humble beginnings, and can be said
to be an amalgam of two other failed climate change initiatives.102 The
sapling that grew into the largest cap-and-trade system of its kind resembles
both a failed attempt by the European Commission to install a carbon tax in
the 1990s, and the Commission’s failed attempt to reject flexible trading
principles set forth in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.103 The EU-ETS was
eventually implemented in 2005 and was split into phases designed to allow

99.
See Petherick, supra note 64, at 595 (explaining negative social impacts of capand-trade).
100.
See EU ETS 2005–2012, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014)
(describing the history and evolution of the EU ETS and its membership) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
101.
See Petherick, supra note 64, at 595 (noting the failures of the EU-ETS).
102.
Frank J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. RES. ECON.
392, 392 (2009) (“The sapling that became EU-ETS was a product of two failures; first, the
European Commission failed in its initiative to introduce an effective EU-wide carbon
energy tax in the nineties. Secondly, the Commission fought unsuccessfully against the
inclusion of trading as a flexible instrument in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.”).
103.
See id. at 392 (noting the EU-ETS’s failure to satisfy the requirements of the
Kyoto Protocol).
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changes to the program over time.104 The first phase, sometimes referred to
as the pilot phase, ran from January 2005 to December 2007 and was
designed to be a feeling-out process in which the ETS allocated allowances
freely.105 The EU described the first stage as a “learning by doing phase.”106
Fifteen member states of the EU initially adopted the program,
incorporating around 12,000 carbon polluters from many different
industries.107 During 2005, the ETS traded 260 million tons of CO2.108
During the following year, the price of the allowances rose to
approximately thirty Euros per ton of carbon dioxide, representing the
highest level an allowance for carbon has been traded in the ETS
program.109 Then, a handful of EU countries confirmed that their actual
emissions were less than the number of allowances allocated to them,
resulting in the price of allowances plunging fifty-four percent in one
week.110 The EU had inadvertently over-allocated allowances to the
emitters and the lack of scarcity continued to push the price of allowances
down.111 By 2007, the price of allowances in the ETS was almost zero,
which in turn obliterated the incentive for the targeted polluters to continue
to limit their GHG emissions.112 The overabundance was caused by the EU
allocating too many allowances, and by the fact that during the first few
years of the program, polluters lowered their carbon emissions, so they did
not need as many additional allowances.113 In the first phase of the EUETS, carbon emissions actually rose by 0.68%.114
104.
See C. Böhringer & A. Lange, European Union’s Emissions Trading System, 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCE & ENVTL. ECON., 155–60 (2013) (describing the
origins of the EU-ETS).
105.
See id. at 156 (detailing the early phases of the program).
106.
See Marjan Peeters & Stefan Weishaar, Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS:
“Learning by Doing” Continues Beyond 2012, 2009 CARBON AND CLIMATE L. REV. 88, 91
(2009) (explaining the early uncertainties of the EU-ETS).
107.
See Yue-Jun Zhang & Yi-Ming Wei, An Overview of Current Research on EU
ETS: Evidence from Its Operating Mechanism and Economic Effect, 87 APP. ENERGY 1805,
1807 (2010) (detailing the early impacts of the EU-ETS).
108.
See id. (stating the amount of carbon credits that the EU-ETS traded in 2005).
109.
See Beat Hintermann, Allowance Price Drivers in the First Phase of the EU ETS,
59 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 43, 48 (2010) (“The price [of allowances] increased from
around €7 in January 2005 to above €30 in April 2006 before crashing to below €10 within
three days.”).
110.
See id. (explaining trends in allowances for cap-and-trade).
111.
See id. (describing imprecise allocation of allowances that frustrated the purpose
of the program).
112.
See id. (noting the failure of allowances to incentivize carbon polluters to reduce
their emissions).
113.
See Simon Caney & Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: Unethical Unjust and
Ineffective 31 (Centre for Climate Change Econ. and Pol’y Working Paper No. 49, June
2011), available at http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/Papers/5059/WP59_carbon-trading-caney-hepburn.pdf (“[F]irms actually reduced their emissions in
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2. Impact of the EU-ETS on Aviation
An expansion of the scope of the program, and a desire to
incorporate aviation emissions underscored the second phase of the EUETS.115 The program began including aviation emissions in 2008.116 All
flights to or from airports in the ETS countries, no matter the carrier
nationality, would be required to obtain allowances to cover CO2
emissions.117 This was Europe’s attempt to create a Border Tax Adjustment
(BTA) by selecting the aviation industry as the first to try this scheme.118
The European Committee believed that this additional industry of polluters
would increase the scarcity of the allowances by creating more demand for
said allowances, while making a larger impact on lowering carbon
emissions in the transportation sector.119 Some foreign governments and
airlines argued “that the EU-ETS in its current form is both unjustly
harmful to airlines” and works to effectively nullify previous treaties.120
Most notably, the U.S. and China opposed the expansion of the EU-ETS
into aviation emissions.121 The U.S. even went so far as to pass anti-ETS
legislation called the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme

the first two years of the phase, motivated by high prices in the 2005 and 2006 period, so
that they didn’t need as many allowances in 2007. Second, regulators handed out too many
EUAs in the first place.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
114.
See Press Release, European Commission, Emissions Trading: 2007 Verified
Emissions from EU ETS Businesses (May 23, 2008), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-787_en.htm?locale=en (highlighting the net
increase in carbon emissions during the preliminary phase of the program) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
115.
See Robert Malina, The Impact of the European Union Trading Scheme on U.S.
Aviation, 19 J. OF AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 36, 36 (2012) (stating that in 2008 the emissions
trading scheme was expanded to include air travel).
116.
See Annela Anger & Jonathan Köhler, Including Aviation Emissions in the EU
ETS: Much Ado About Nothing?, 17 TRANSP. POL. 38, 39 (2010) (discussing the
implementation of the EU-ETS pursuant to the EU’s adoption of the Kyoto Protocol).
117.
See id. at 39 (noting that the program includes all international flights, unlike the
Kyoto Protocol, which only tracked domestic flights).
118.
See Robert Ireland, The EU Emissions Policy and Border Tax Adjustments 3
(World Customs Organization Research Paper No. 26, 2012) (discussing the analogy
between the European Union’s aviation emissions policy and carbon border tax adjustments)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
119.
See Anger & Köhler, supra note 116, at 42 (noting that more efficient airlines that
release fewer emissions incur lower costs).
120.
Malina, supra note 115, at 36.
121.
See id. at 36 (stating that both the United States and China have requested
exemptions).
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Prohibition Act of 2011.122 In response, the EU included an exemption
clause.123
3. Recent EU-ETS Developments
Phase I of the EU-ETS implementation saw another issue with an
over-allocation of allowances causing the price of those allowances to fall
again.124 One factor for the fall in the allowance prices is that the European
nations as well as most of the developed world suffered a recession in
2008.125 This resulted in corporations and citizens using less energy, and as
a result, carbon polluters lowered their output, creating less need for
allowances.126 During Phase II, the price for allowances plummeted further,
diminishing the incentive polluters had to reduce their GHG emissions.127
By the time the EU voted against a proposal to withhold some 900 million
future-dated allowances in January 2013, the price for an allowance of one
ton of carbon fell to under three Euros.128 As more countries joined the EUETS during the second phase from 2008 to 2012, the program looked to
begin incorporating national emissions registries into one EU registry.129
122.
See European Union Emission Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (prohibiting civil aircrafts from the United States from
participating in the EU-ETS).
123.
See Malina, supra note 115, at 36 (“Under current EU legislation, an exemption
may be granted for airlines from countries that implement measures ‘equivalent’ to those in
the EU to reduce GHG emissions.”).
124.
See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (displaying data that documents the price
decline, and discussing the possibility that over-allocation may have been part of the reason
that aggregate emissions were below total allocations).
125.
See COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MEETING CARBON BUDGETS—THE NEED
FOR A STEP CHANGE: PROGRESS REPORT TO PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE
34
(2009),
available
at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document
/other/9789999100076/9789999100076.pdf [hereinafter MEETING CARBON BUDGETS]
(stating that the recession caused the price of carbon to fall) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
126.
See id. at 67 (noting that the recession has impacted energy-intensive industries
and that emissions have thus fallen, so there is less emissions reduction effort needed to meet
the cap).
127.
See id. at 68 (presenting data that shows that the price of allowances declined
during Phase II).
128.
See ETS RIP?, supra note 69 (presenting data showing the decline in price for a
carbon allowance from approximately twenty euros in 2010 to less than three euros in 2013).
129.
See Prajakt Samant & Simone Goligorsky, EU Emissions Trading System Single
L.
REV.
(May
14,
2012),
Registry:
Timetable
Announced,
NAT’L.
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-emissions-trading-system-single-registry-timetableannounced (stating that the European Commission announced a single registry with the
purpose of incorporating the national emissions registries into a single location) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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Now in Phase III, running from 2013 to 2020, the EU-ETS is
focusing on switching from allocating allowances, to auctioning them
off.130 The program will also look to incorporate Australia’s carbon trading
system to make both systems compatible with one another.131 The last
phase, Phase IV, slated for 2021–2028, could look to increase the rate at
which the cap is decreased each year.132
According to the UBS Investment Research, the EU-ETS cost $287
billion through 2011 and had “almost zero impact” on the volume of overall
emissions of the EU.133 If that same amount of money had been used to
upgrade power plants, or in another targeted way, it could have lowered
emissions in the EU by forty-three percent.134
4. Why the EU-ETS is Failing
Over the course of its eight-year lifespan, the EU-ETS has
struggled to maintain viability throughout Europe, due to a number of
factors that have led this system to be inefficient.135 First and foremost, as

130.
See Tim Laing, Assessing the Effectiveness of the European Union Emissions
Trading System 22 (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. and Pol. Working Paper No. 126, 2013),
available
at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/WorkingPa
pers/Papers/100-109/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf
(“Phase
II
allocation plans have made a move away from free allowance allocation, with all power
generation installations in the UK required to buy their permits in auction. The EU ETS as a
whole is moving in this direction and will move away from free allocation in the power
sector, virtually completely, by Phase III.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
131.
See
The
EU
Emissions
Trading
System,
EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (“The
European Commission has agreed in principle to link the ETS with Australia’s system in
stages from mid-2015.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
132.
See 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (stating that
the rate has to be increased to forty percent of 1990 levels by 2030) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
133.
See Sid Maher, Europe’s $287bn Carbon “Waste:” UBS Report, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/europes-287bn-carbonwaste-ubs-report/story-fn59niix-1226203068972# (“UBS says the European Union’s
emissions trading scheme has cost the continent’s consumers $287 billion for “almost zero
impact” on cutting carbon emissions . . . .”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
134.
See id. (“In a damning report to clients, UBS Investment Research said that had
the €210bn the European ETS had cost consumers been used in a targeted approach to
replace the EU’s dirtiest power plants, emissions could have been reduced by 43% . . . .”).
135.
See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 29 (finding that the main problem was
inefficiency, led by failures in equality of price allowance and marginal abatement costs).
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detailed above, there was a vast over-allocation of allowances in both Phase
I and Phase II of the program.136 This over-allocation clearly illuminates the
difficulties inherent when a regulator attempts to set a carbon emissions cap
that is both workable and sustainable.137 There will always be imperfections
in a cap because there is no way to predict the future of a national economy,
much less dozens of them.138 The allocation process was also flawed in that
it effectively rewarded the worst emitters.139 Allocations were awarded
based on the historical emission levels for the targeted emitters.140 In
function, this gave the most advantage to the continent’s worst GHG
emitters.141 In addition, it was very difficult to predict how a given country
would react to the implementation of the EU-ETS. Many targeted emitters
in the scheme were able to successfully reduce emissions below the initial
cap.142 This led to countries seeing a reduction in the amount of carbon
emissions they were producing.143 While this is obviously a positive change
toward the end goal of lowering carbon emissions, it also exacerbated the
issue the EU-ETS created when it over-allocated the emissions
allowances.144 In correlation with this two-fold issue of over-allocation, the
price of the allowances dropped due to the most basic principles of supply
and demand.145 There was simply no demand for the high supply of
allowances that the EU-ETS had allocated to the various targeted

136.
See id. at 2 (stating that the price crashed after the first round of emissions
verifications and after Phase II showing that the markets were over-allocated).
137.
See id. (discussing how difficult it is to find the specific reasons for the allowance
price movement, which still confounds market analysts and economists).
138.
See id. (implying that there will always be imperfections in the cap due to the
inability to predict how the market will move the price, as the underlying reasons are still
unknown).
139.
See COELHO, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that the first two phases allocated free
permits according to historical emissions, which effectively served as a subsidy for the
biggest polluters).
140.
See id. (“In the first phase, from 2005 to 2007, free permits were allocated
according to historical emissions.”).
141.
See id. (stating that the historical emissions policy had a tendency to benefit the
biggest polluters).
142.
See Press Release, supra note 114 (providing data regarding emissions reductions).
143.
See id. (illustrating that several countries, including Belgium, France, Portugal,
and Sweden, reduced the amount of carbon emissions that they were emitting).
144.
See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (stating that over-abatement and overallocation was such a problem because of the much lower actual emissions).
145.
See Reem Heakal, Economics Basics: Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited Feb. 6,
2014) (defining the relationship between supply and price: as supply increases, price
decreases) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
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emitters.146 This factor, more than any other, has plagued the cap-and-trade
system because it has given emitters no economic incentive to lower their
carbon emissions.
The economic recession is also causing problems for the EU-ETS
market, as a recession reduces the need for emission permits, as actual
output is lower than the scheme’s projections that dictate the availability of
emission permits.147 The 2008 banking (and oil)148 recession, which
severely affected the economic foundation of the several EU countries
(leading to bailouts)149 as well as the world economy, created a large drop
in the amount of energy that nations used.150 Three “main determinants”
influence the level of emissions in an economy: the demand for electricity,
the price of carbon dioxide, and fuel prices.151 Power plants release
significant emissions used by commercial, residential, and industrial
146.
See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (arguing that there was no demand for
allowances because the actual emissions were substantially less than the allocations
provided).
147.
See MEETING CARBON BUDGETS, supra note 125, at 2 (noting that the biggest
challenge for cap-and-trade programs is the economic environment, as economic conditions
will have major implications for the path of emissions).
148.
See Maximilian A. Staedtler, Crude Oil Prices, WHAT MATTERS,
http://economatters.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/what-matters-crude-oil-price-chart.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2014) (displaying the drop in oil prices before and after the 2008 recession)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT); see also Sam Montana, What Caused the Great Recession of 2008–2009?,
KNOJI,
http://economics-the-economy.knoji.com/what-caused-the-great-recession-of20082009/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (discussing how the 2008 recession is referred to as
the banking or housing recession due to the housing price boom and lax lending standards)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT); Tom Therramus, Oil Caused Recession, Not Wall Street, OIL-PRICE.NET,
http://oil-price.net/en/articles/oil-caused-recession-not-wallstreet.php (last visited Feb. 16,
2014) (arguing that the crisis was exacerbated because the price of oil climbed from $10 a
barrel in 1998 to $147 a barrel by the summer of 2008 and that the rapid rise in energy prices
reduced economic demand and made homeownership difficult for many as transportation
costs soared) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
149.
See Cyprus Becomes Fifth Country To Seek Bailout, DEUTCHE WELLE,
http://www.dw.de/cyprus-becomes-fifth-country-to-seek-bailout/a-16049277 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2014) (stating that several European countries have been bailed out due to the
severe recession, including Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal, which has
distracted the EU from its goal of leading the world to lower levels of emissions) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
150.
See Bruno Declercq, Erik Delarue & William D’haeseleer, Impact of the Economic
Recession on the European Power Sector’s CO2 Emissions, 39 ENERGY POLICY 1, 11–12
(“The total difference in emissions of the simulated European power sector during [2008 and
2009] amounts to 175 Mton.”).
151.
See id. at 1 (examining “the impact of the economic recession on CO2 emissions in
the European power sector”).
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buildings.152 Typically, building and utility sectors account for around
sixty-three percent of an economy's total emissions.153 As the recession
reduced the demand for electricity because consumers had to save money
(high unemployment and financial crises along with corporations going
bankrupt), the level of carbon emissions declined significantly among
power sector facilities.154 While the lowering of carbon emissions from the
power sector is a good result for the environment and public health, it
exacerbated the over-allocation issue that was disintegrating the carbon
trading market in the EU-ETS.155
This global economic phenomenon was not something designed
into the ETS system, and because it was beyond the ETS system’s control
and required multiple countries to vote to change the rules, a quick response
was near impossible.156 This recession highlighted a key problem with capand-trade systems using this type of market-based carbon reduction
strategy: external pressures on the carbon market can further cripple capand-trade systems, which rely on stability and are not readily adaptable to
extreme market forces.157 In a cap-and-trade approach, as goes the
economic climate, so goes the effectiveness of the legislation.158
Lastly, the EU-ETS is failing because it is not creating the desired
effect on its targeted emitters.159 The cap-and-trade legislation was first
proposed because the EU believed carbon dioxide posed a serious threat to
the nations making up the EU and to the rest of the world.160 The ETS was
152.
See id. at 11 (describing a model based upon the significant emissions of power
plants).
153.
See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2014)
(stating that electricity creation comprises thirty-three percent, industry twenty percent, and
real estate eleven percent of United States greenhouse emissions) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
154.
See Bruno et al., supra note 150, at 2 (stating that the recession decreased demand
for electricity).
155.
See LUCAS MERRILL BROWN, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING
SYSTEM:
RESULTS
AND
LESSONS
LEARNED
11
(2012),
available
at
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EU_ETS_Lessons_Learned_Report_EDF.pdf (stating
that while firms invested in emission reductions, over-allocation was a serious problem) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
156.
See id. at 27 (discussing the feasibility of quickly responding to phenomena by
explaining rigorous regulations that each of the twenty-seven member states must adhere).
157.
See id. at 5 (noting that commentators have argued that the reductions occurred
because of the recession).
158.
See id. (stating that the EU-ETS is based on other cap-and-trade systems, which
tend to have faster and cheaper results).
159.
See Frank Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. RES.
ECON. 391, 392 (2009) (outlining a primary failure of the EU-ETS).
160.
See id. (describing the reasoning behind the system).
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designed to tackle the dangers of rapidly rising GHG emissions by creating
an incentive for polluters to invest in energy efficiency and clean energy,
while consumers reduced demand for carbon-intensive products and
fuels.161 Yet due to the program allocating (and over-allocating) allowances
instead of auctioning them, emitters had no incentive to change their
habits.162 For all of the money, time, and resources used to implement this
program, it has failed to reach the primary goal of its enactment.163
5. Windfall Profits and Uneven Burdens
While proving inefficient in combatting carbon emissions and
failing to establish a viable carbon market in all economic conditions, the
EU-ETS has been biased, providing a distinct economic advantage to some
of the players.164 A detailed analysis of the power sector under the EU-ETS
shows that a significant portion of the costs of carbon emission allowance
(whether allocated freely or auctioned) have been passed on to consumers,
generating windfall profits for wholesale power producers in Europe.165 In
essence, the EU-ETS has unintentionally worked to bolster the power
industry’s profits throughout Europe.166 This realization further
demonstrates just how ineffective the cap-and-trade approach has been at
sending the correct message to emitters.167 Instead of rebuking the power
industry for emitting carbon into the atmosphere by ensuring that it incurs
economic penalties, the EU-ETS has instead allowed emitters to see record
profits while ignoring the underlying purpose of the program altogether.168
While the power companies’ profits soared, electricity consumers
throughout Europe have been forced to bear the burden of the program.169
Studies show that electricity consumers have seen an increase in costs for

161.
See id. at 395 (explaining the benefits and incentive structure of the EU-ETS).
162.
See Coelho, supra note 63, at 6 (outlining why the EU-ETS has been so ineffective
in reducing emissions).
163.
See id. at 4 (noting that the EU-ETS did not achieve its intended goal).
164.
See Wietze Lise et al., The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices, Profits and Emissions
in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the 47 COMPETES EU20 Model, 47 ENVTL.
RES. ECON. 23, 24 (2010) (describing the unintended advantages of the EU-ETS).
165.
See id. (explaining the unintended consequence of the carbon emission allowances
under the EU-ETS).
166.
See id. (noting the increased profits to an industry the regulations were supposed to
discourage).
167.
See id. (outlining how windfall profits undermine the purpose of an emissions
reduction regime).
168.
See id. (describing how the EU-ETS actually resulted in increased emissions).
169.
See id. at 23 (stating that consumers, the intended beneficiaries of this system, are
actually paying for the system).
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using energy due to the trickledown effect of this approach.170 Rather than
creating stability and certainty, the EU-ETS over the course of eight years
has resulted in a fragile, unpredictable, inefficient, and unfair approach to
reducing carbon emissions.171
6. Carbon Leakage and the Need for Border Tax Adjustments
The EU’s competitiveness with other global economies has been
impacted by carbon leakage, a by-product of the EU-ETS.172 Carbon
leakage occurs when a developed country threatens or puts into effect
restrictions on carbon emissions (cap-and-trade for example) and
subsequently emission-dependent industries relocate to countries with no
emissions restrictions.173
The emitter under restriction—here, industries based in the EU—
will need to increase the price of their goods to compensate for internalizing
the cost of their emissions.174 A competitor, from China, the U.S., or
another global economy, however, can keep its prices low (or add to
profits) because it does not need to internalize the cost of its emissions by
adhering to such a restriction.175 This leakage not only leads to an economic
disadvantage for industries in regulated areas, but also undercuts the efforts
of the reduction program by increasing emissions in non-regulated areas.176
Anecdotal evidence shows this already occurred during the 1990s and
2000s. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil led to the drafting
of the Kyoto Protocol and called upon developed countries to reduce their
GHG emissions.177 This seems to have led to rapid increases in foreign
170.
See id. (verifying that the cost is being passed on to the intended beneficiaries
through studies).
171.
See id. (noting the negative results of the EU-ETS).
172.
See Stephanie Monjon & Phillippe Quirion, A Border Adjustment for the EU ETS:
Reconciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage 3 (2012) (presented at the
X Annual Conf. of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade, Inter-American
Development Bank, Milan, Italy, Oct. 19–20, 2012) (describing how border tax adjustments
could revive the global competitiveness of the EU economy) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
173.
See Glen P. Peters & Edgar G. Hertwich, Trading Kyoto, 2 NATURE REPORTS 40,
40 (2008) (defining the process of carbon leakage).
174.
See id. at 41 (describing the industry sales and cost structure under this regime).
175.
See Kathy Baylis et al., Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon
Policy 2 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that economies that do not
follow the regulations will reduce the regulated area’s competitiveness) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
176.
See id. (describing the result in non-regulated jurisdictions).
177.
See John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 149, 161 (2010) (outlining the Kyoto Protocol’s GHG reduction requirements).
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direct investment (FDI) into developing countries with no emissions
objectives or restrictions following these announcements.178 The result:
rapidly rising emissions in developing countries.179 It appears that
developed countries promising or actually capping emissions resulted in
significant FDI into developing countries, allowing “nations to benefit from
the omission to internalize environmental negativities could be both
environmentally and economically counter-productive . . . [i]f mobile
taxpaying industries relocate to pollution haven countries that offer little
environmental regulation . . . .”180
In an effort to combat the problem of carbon leakage, many
economists and environmentalists have suggested the implementation of
Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs).181 These taxing mechanisms work to
create a more even playing field by levying fees onto goods manufactured
in countries without carbon emission measures, which are imported into an
area that uses some form of carbon taxation.182 This strategy reduces or
eliminates the advantage gained by emitters not operating under emission
reduction implements.183
The EU-ETS does not incorporate a BTA strategy and the EU
continues to be disadvantaged on the global economic stage.184 The reasons
the European Commission has yet to enact a BTA program is likely tied to
the difficulty in implementing such a program.185 The EU would need to
determine the scope and extent to which the BTA would apply, and ensure
that it satisfies the World Trade Organization’s rules.186 The EU’s
reluctance could also be attributed to the fear that implementing a BTA
would upset the fragile trading balance in the region.187

178.
See id. at 164 (noting a loophole in which enterprises move to countries with few
or no environmental restrictions).
179.
See id. (explaining that the loophole actually leads to more GHG emissions in the
unregulated countries).
180.
Id. at 157–58.
181.
See id. at 153 (explaining the economic and scientific justifications for BTAs over
cap-and-trade programs).
182.
See id. at 153–54 (describing how BTAs operate).
183.
See id. at 152 (arguing that BTAs resolve the problems that have arisen under the
EU-ETS).
184.
See Frank Venmans, A Literature-Based Multi-Criteria Evaluation of the EU ETS,
16 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 5493, 5498 (2012) (outlining the EU’s
current regime and how it does not include a BTA strategy).
185.
See id. (explaining one of the possible reasons why a BTA strategy has not been
utilized).
186.
See Monjon, supra note 172, at 2 (noting the potential for a BTA strategy to
conflict with WTO rules).
187.
See Venmans, supra note 184, at 5498 (describing a possible reason for not
enacting a BTA policy).
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Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether cap-and-trade is the
best system or whether a carbon tax more efficiently reduces emissions for
the EU?188
III. Carbon Tax
A. Carbon Tax at a Glance
With the struggles of the EU-ETS weighing heavily on the minds
of legislatures around the world, the question becomes: is there a more
effective way to enact climate change legislation?189 The most popular
alternative to the cap-and-trade scheme is carbon taxation.190 A carbon tax
is a tax levied on each ton of carbon dioxide emitted.191 Most of the
literature recognizes the carbon tax as the most basic form of climate
change regulation that aims to lower carbon emissions.192 As I have
previously discussed, carbon emitters, be they consumers, producers, or
distributers, create negative externalities in the form of pollution that affects
every aspect of society.193 A carbon tax acts as an instrument that
internalizes those negative externalities.194 Environmentally, a carbon tax
implements the “polluter pays” principle, outlined in Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration.195 Economically, this internalization through carbon taxation

188.
See Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax is Better than Cap and
Trade 1257–62 (U. of Colo. Law School, Working Paper No. 09-18, Oct. 15, 2009)
(outlining the differences between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system).
189.
See id. (describing a more effective alternative to the EU-ETS).
190.
See generally Levy, supra note 88 (explaining that carbon taxation is most
attractive option other than the cap-and-trade system).
191.
See Miles Young, Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an Effective Capand-Trade Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 5 BYU L. REV. 1379, 1380
(2009) (explaining how a carbon tax operates).
192.
See Waggoner, supra note 188, at 1258 (outlining the basic nature of the carbon
tax system).
193.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 3 (citing W.J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control
of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (Oct. 1960)) (explaining that there are numerous negative consequences from
carbon emissions).
194.
See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (describing how a carbon tax would reduce the
negative consequences currently associated with a cap-and-trade system).
195.
See United Nations Conf. on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 16 U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (“[T]he polluter should,
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without
distorting international trade and investment.”).
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creates a justifiable reason to impose the tax.196 In summary, a carbon tax
mandates that whoever causes the pollution is responsible for bearing the
costs of the harm the pollution creates, as well as the cost of minimizing
future harm.197
Interestingly, many politicians do not support a carbon tax.198 As
detailed above, this negativity likely stems from the unpopularity of
anything called a tax.199 Carbon taxes, however, have many distinct benefits
that should make the strategy appealing to both politicians and citizens
alike.200 Carbon taxes ensure that products reflect their environmental
impacts, advocate new environmental technologies, generate revenue, and
concern a very limited implementation phase.201 Additionally, proponents
of carbon taxes champion the advantages of the tax for its lack of
interference with other regulatory systems, the unmistakable message the
tax sends, and the price stability of carbon taxation.202
Carbon taxation proposals generally offer two directions for the
revenue created by the revenue-neutral tax.203 The first is an equal
dividends approach, where the revenues would be rebated directly to all
residents of a particular country or region in equal portions.204 The second
revenue direction, a taxation shift approach, takes each dollar of revenue
and reduces the existing taxes by that amount.205 This approach could offset
federal or state income taxes, payroll taxes, or sales (VAT) taxes.206 Both of
these approaches return revenue to consumers and would make the public
196.
See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (“[E]nvironmental taxation is typically justified as
a way to internalize negative externalities, requiring economic actors to take the full costs of
their behaviour into account when determining their actions.”).
197.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that future harm will be minimized if
the carbon tax is implemented).
198.
See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 72, at 25 (stating that many legislatures have only
enacted a cap-and-trade system).
199.
See id. (describing the reasons why cap-and-trade systems have been embraced
rather than carbon tax systems).
200.
See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (noting the advantages of a carbon tax system).
201.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 7 (outlining specific benefits of a
carbon tax).
202.
See, e.g., Roberta Mann, To Tax or Not to Tax Carbon—Is That the Question?, 24
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 44, 44 (2009) (describing the advantages of a carbon tax system over a
cap-and-trade system).
203.
See Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably, CARBON TAX CTR.,
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction (last updated Sept. 17, 2013) (“Two primary return
approaches are being discussed.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
204.
See id. (discussing the equal dividends approach).
205.
See id. (“In the other revenue return method, each dollar of carbon tax revenue
would trigger a dollar’s worth of reduction in existing taxes . . . .”).
206.
See id. (noting that federal payroll tax and state sales tax could be reduced under
the plan).
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more amenable to a carbon tax, and both approaches are generally designed
to ensure that the tax does not become regressive.207 Unfortunately, much
like cap-and-trade proposals, there is no assurance that the underlying goal
of lowering carbon emissions will be served by these types of carbon taxes
because they focus on consumers reducing their carbon consumption
through new and improved technologies, energy efficiencies and cleaner
power plants.208
Before the adoption of the EU-ETS, the EU proposed a carbon tax
to be implemented broadly over Europe.209 However, many EU members
viewed the broad taxation as a threat to national autonomy because tax
authority is traditionally a sovereign right of individual countries.210 Similar
arguments for autonomy would likely occur if similar mitigation efforts
involving taxation were attempted in NAFTA211 or other economic or
political unions. Every nation belonging to the EU, however, has some form
of an energy tax.212 Additionally, the European Commission has issued
directives recommending energy taxes that address global climate
change.213
Carbon taxation has the potential to be more effective than the
current EU-ETS cap-and-trade program currently in place; however, a
carbon tax has many of the same drawbacks.214 The largest potential pitfall
of a carbon tax is that while it provides price certainty, it does not guarantee
that emissions will be reduced.215 Just like cap-and-trade systems, there are
207.
See id. (explaining that equal dividends and taxation shift approaches are both
progressive schemes and not regressive).
208.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 26 (discussing consumer choice in
automobiles and the higher price of low emission vehicles as reasons why the increased
production of more efficient cars might not immediately reduce emissions).
209.
See Convery, supra note 159, at 392–93 (2009) (discussing the failure of the 1992
EU-wide proposal).
210.
See id. (discussing concerns that the tax would impede on States’ autonomy to tax
and manage their economies).
211.
See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, H.R. Doc.
No. 103-159, 32 I.L.M. 289 (creating a free trade region that includes the United States,
Canada, and Mexico).
212.
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TAXATION TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2009)
(discussing the different tax rates of members of the European Union) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
213.
See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/96, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L283) (EC) (“Member
States shall impose taxation on energy products and electricity in accordance with this
Directive.”).
214.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 17–20 (discussing the drawbacks of
a carbon tax).
215.
See Naomi Oreskes, Metaphors of Warfare and the Lessons of History: Time to
Revisit a Carbon Tax?, 104 CLIMATIC CHANGE 223, 227–28 (2011) (discussing the argument
that taxation does not guarantee reduction in emissions).

CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT

385

incentives under a carbon tax for polluters to lower their carbon emissions,
but this does not ensure that the reductions will occur, or that they will be
sufficient to avoid the disastrous impacts of global warming.216 Nothing in
the carbon tax system implements new cleaner forms of energy.217 A carbon
tax has the same limitations that cap-and-trade programs have in that they
may not address the main underlying issues for the GHG emission
legislation, environmental and public health.218
B. Advantages of Carbon Taxation Over Cap-and-Trade
Carbon taxation has some clear-cut advantages over the current
EU-ETS system as well as other cap-and-trade emission reduction
strategies. These advantages are present in the implementation of the
program, the certainty of the program’s effectiveness, the ability to enforce
the carbon tax, and the environmental impact of the program.219
1. Certainty of Cost and Benefit
It is clear that both carbon taxation and cap-and-trade systems are
market-oriented schemes constructed to reduce carbon emissions.220 Yet,
there is still an ongoing debate on which approach is superior.221 Perhaps
the largest area of discrepancy between the two approaches is the benefit
certainty versus cost certainty standard.222
In a cap-and-trade system, the cap, or maximum amount of
allowable emissions, provides the environmental benefit from the emissions
reduction.223 This is called the “benefit certainty.”224 “Benefit certainty,”
however, does not mean that benefits will actually occur, as we have

216.
See id. at 227 (arguing that neither cap-and-trade programs nor a tax on carbon
emissions can guarantee that GHG emission reductions will be made).
217.
See id. (stating that carbon taxes are only proven to raise revenue).
218.
See id. at 228 (explaining that the public’s approach to a carbon tax regime affects
the amount that GHG emissions are lowered).
219.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 37–45 (discussing the advantages of
a carbon tax).
220.
See id. at 5–7 (noting that both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system are market
based approaches).
221.
See id. at 50 (concluding that a carbon tax is a better approach than cap-and-trade).
222.
See id. at 36 (discussing the relationship of benefit certainty to cap-and-trade and
cost certainty to a tax on carbon emissions).
223.
See id. (“Cap and trade, because it imposes an overall cap on the level of
emissions permitted in the economy, provides certainty as to the environmental benefit that
results from its implementation.”).
224.
See id. (discussing the meaning of “benefit certainty”).
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noticed in the EU, which is the biggest flaw of cap-and-trade.225
Additionally, all cap-and-trade programs have reversion mechanisms to a
carbon tax should the price of carbon get out of hand.226 In other words, a
country would never shut down its power sector simply because emission
permits for the year were all used by November.
The carbon taxation system, on the other hand, relies on a predetermined carbon emissions price, set in advance, allowing emitters to
plan future power plant upgrades to reduce emissions and improve
efficiencies.227 It also allows consumers to plan their purchases.228 With this
set pricing strategy, carbon taxation establishes cost certainty.229 Cap-andtrade programs cannot match this cost certainty because there will be
fluctuations in the market over time, and the cost will be adjusted
accordingly.230 In practice, this stability in price that coincides with a
carbon tax could prove to be as much as five times more cost-effective than
cap-and-trade programs.231 It is also important to note that the “benefit
certainty” of the cap-and-trade program can be nullified if the cap is set at
an inappropriate level and there is no incentive for emitters to comply with
the regulations.232 This is precisely what occurred in the initial phases of the
EU-ETS.233 The “benefit certainty” was undermined because overallocation of allowances negated the incentive for emitters to comply with
the regulation, leading to disappointing emissions reduction results.234 Thus,
the certainty of the benefit is somewhat of a misnomer because the benefit
is not concrete. In carbon taxation, while there is no “benefit certainty” (an

225.
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing disadvantages of cap-and-trade).
226.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 43 (discussing safety valves as the
only way to prevent cost uncertainty in cap-and-trade regimes).
227.
See id. at 36 (“[T]he precise amount of the tax is set in advance.”).
228.
See id. at 42–44 (stating that cost certainty for businesses allows them to plan
ahead because they are certain of possible tax rates).
229.
See id. at 42 (describing the pricing of a carbon tax regime).
230.
See id. at 42–43 (discussing how market fluctuation and the changing price of
allowances in a cap-and-trade system could undermine the entire system).
231.
See Kenneth C. Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A Consensus Perspective on
the Tax-Versus-Cap Debate 1 (July 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154638 (“A carbon tax . . . would provide price stability, and
could theoretically be five times more cost-efficient than cap-and-trade.”) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
232.
See id. at 1 (“[T]he ‘environmental certainty’ of caps and standards is a dubious
advantage if emissions are not actually capped at a sustainable level, and if the regulations
provide no incentive for over compliance even when emission prices are very low.”).
233.
See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 45 (describing the first phase of the EU-ETS).
234.
See id. at 45–46 (stating that emissions were well under the cap set based on
industry projections and the price of allowances dropped substantially).
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issue addressed by carbon tax with reinvestment),235 there is, however, clear
“cost certainty.”236 The debate between which “certainty” is better becomes
tilted heavily in cost certainty’s favor when political intervention and
unsustainable caps join the equation. In this regard, carbon taxation is a
superior market-based approach to reduce GHG emissions.
2. Implementing the Strategy
Cap-and-trade is a strategy wrought with complexity.237 This
complexity is somewhat limited due to the “upstream” nature of the
program.238 In essence, the cap imposes taxation onto the producer, rather
than the final produced good, meaning most of the citizenry is unaffected
by the taxation.239 Citizens will see the added cost, but do not need to
purchase permits to pollute. While this appears to imply a more simple
approach because fewer emitters are involved, the system creates
complexity in implementation and oversight of the scheme.240 First, the
cap-and-trade program calls for extensive data collection in order to
establish the cap amount.241 Then a decision to allocate, evenly distribute,
or auction allowances must be made.242
While this is simple in theory, the EU-ETS has shown it can be
complex in its application and can create serious deficiencies if the program
is not adjusted appropriately.243 When the legislation calls for free
allowance allocation, the regulators in the scheme must decide who is to
235.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 613–14 (arguing for a regime of carbon tax with
reinvestment).
236.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 42 (describing the cost certainty of
carbon tax regimes).
237.
See Zhang, supra note 107, at 1805 (stating that the complexity of the EU-ETS is
“universally acknowledged”).
238.
See Joseph Aldy & Robert Stavins, Economic Incentives in a New Climate
Agreement 3 (Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Working Paper, 2008) (discussing policy choices
that lead to upstream regulation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
239.
See id. (stating that cap-and-trade works to limit the emissions of a producer).
240.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 38 (“[T]he trading in allowances
needs to be set up and monitored: a system needs to be devised to prevent the same
allowance from being used twice, and penalties need to be established for polluters who
exceed their allowances.”).
241.
See id. at 38–39 (explaining that one complexity of a cap-and-trade system is
determining where to set the cap).
242.
See id. at 38 (describing that another complexity of a cap-and-trade system is that
“the proposal needs to determine how allowances will be created and distributed, either for
free or by auction”).
243.
See generally Petherick, supra note 64 (analyzing the cost of carbon in the
European market).
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receive the allowances and how many allowances they should receive.244
Again, a simple-sounding task proved to be difficult during Phase I and II
of the EU-ETS.245 In an auction of allowances, the regulating body must
monitor the process of the auctioning to prevent fraud.246 This necessary
fraud management strategy would also surely increase the cost of the capand-trade program.247 Next, another system of monitoring needs to be
enacted to ensure fair trading of the outstanding allowances, those allocated
freely or auctioned off. This endeavor would ensure that allowances are
utilized once, but not more.248 In addition, cap-and-trade legislation must
create an international enforcement policy for rule breakers if allowances
are traded across international borders.249 Lastly, provisions must be put in
place to regulate banking and borrowing allowances.250 These provisions
would create safety measures to protect against extreme cost uncertainty.251
If the cap-and-trade program calls for offsets for carbon sequestration and
storage, a provision must also regulate these activities.252 Cap-and-trade
programs, if they are to be effective, must also entail intense monitoring
and reporting initiatives.253 It cannot be denied that all the requirements
inherent in a cap-and-trade program impose complexities onto the
implementation of the program.254 Further, the more complex the program,
the longer it takes to create and adjust each aspect of the scheme.255 In
244.
See Aldy & Stavins, supra note 238, at 2 (describing the decisions that
policymakers face after choosing an allowance program).
245.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 49 (stating that the initial EU-ETS
has not been successful).
246.
See id. at 38 (discussing how the auction system requires a complex monitoring
system in order to prevent cheaters).
247.
See id. at 48 (favoring tax programs over cap-and-trade because tax programs are
far less complex and can be administered by the IRS).
248.
See id. at 49 (explaining the need for fraud prevention).
249.
See id. at 47 (discussing the importance of incentivizing renegade nations to
impose carbon taxes).
250.
See Aldy & Stavins, supra note 238, at 3 (explaining the importance of banking
and borrowing provisions for effective emissions regulation).
251.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 47 (stating that banking and
borrowing provisions smooth the prices of allowances over time).
252.
See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 246, at 38 (stating that multiple obstacles,
including regulatory obstacles, are associated with carbon sequestration).
253.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 32 (discussing how monitoring and
enforcement costs can easily become unwieldy in a complex cap-and-trade program).
254.
See id. at 38 (explaining the complexities of cap and trade systems as they
compare to taxes on carbon emissions).
255.
See Kenneth Richards & Stephanie Richards, The Evolution and Anatomy of
Recent Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate: Critique and Recommendations 110 (July
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining the desirability of administrative simplicity in
any program) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
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summation, the EU should cut its losses with the ETS altogether and adopt
a new program, one based on a carbon tax, rather than attempt to adjust the
failing cap-and-trade program, which is so difficult and slow to implement.
Carbon taxation is built around a simpler approach that can be
implemented into the framework that already exists in the European
Commission. There is no need to create and regulate a market, a continuing
struggle for the EU-ETS. A carbon tax could be imposed on all goods and
services in Europe, as well as on all imported goods and services.256 For
example, the tax could be set at ten dollars for every ton of carbon emitted
to create the commodity. The tax could then increase over time as emitters
become more accustomed to the tax.257 A carbon tax program can become
more complex, but complicating it by incorporating tax credits and other
measures would make it more cumbersome to manage. Regardless, it is
much simpler to adopt and manage than similar cap-and-trade
approaches.258
3. Revenue Creation
Another clear advantage of a carbon tax-based program for
reducing carbon emissions over cap-and-trade based programs is that a
carbon tax, no matter the form, will create revenue for the administrator.259
For example, a very low tax of only ten dollars per ton of carbon would
generate multiple billions of dollars for the EU each year.260 Of course, the
higher the tax levied on the carbon emitted, the greater the revenue
amount.261 The use of this revenue would be very determinative of how the
regulated population felt toward the legislation. One of the biggest
criticisms against the carbon tax approach is that it has the potential to be
jeopardized by becoming regressive.262 A cap-and-trade system has the
same drawback.263
256.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 32 (stating that a carbon tax would
be imposed on all carbon, oil, and natural gas, whether domestically produced or imported).
257.
See id. at 32–33 (explaining that the tax could be adjusted over time to produce the
desired results).
258.
See id. at 7 (arguing that a carbon tax system is comparatively easier to implement,
adjust, and enforce).
259.
See id. at 40 (“A carbon tax by definition generates revenue.”).
260.
See id. (predicting that a modest tax of ten dollars per ton of carbon content could
generate upward of fifty billion dollars annually).
261.
See id. (stating that an increase in the rate of taxation will produce an increase in
revenue).
262.
See id. at 41 (suggesting that revenue from the tax should first be used to address
regressive effects).
263.
See id. at 33 (discussing the potentially regressive effects of both tax and cap-andtrade programs).
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Low-income households spend a greater percentage of their income
on energy needs than do higher income earning households.264 Accordingly,
the brunt of any rise in the energy price will be felt more severely by the
low-income earning households.265 Also, certain nations that are more
dependent on coal will participate more in the carbon emissions reductions
set forth in the program.266 The best policy for the EU, or any regulating
group around the world, is to accommodate these political and economic
issues while not compromising the principles that make the program costeffective.267 If enacted correctly, with price stability, carbon taxes will
generate revenues that may be utilized to provide compensation to those
most affected by the tax.
4. Environmental Impact
While we may lose our focus by looking exclusively at economics,
politics, and finance; it is important to remember why this legislation is
important. The goal is to protect the environment and the public’s health.268
In terms of climate change, everyone is a polluter, though not everyone
pollutes to the same extent.269 Perhaps the biggest downfall for the
proposals to date is that neither cap and trade nor carbon taxes have
provided proof that there will be a real reduction of carbon emissions if
their approach is adopted.270 Both merely propose that a reduction of carbon
emissions will likely follow the adoption of the program.271 Cap-and-trade
264.
See Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of U.S.
Climate Policy: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit i (Resources for the Future,
Discussion Paper 08-28, Sept. 2008) (stating that lower income households spend
proportionately more of their incomes on energy expenses) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
265.
See id. (finding that this distinction in proportional spending will lead to lower
income families experiencing a more noticeable increase in energy prices).
266.
See Richard Tol, The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate
Change: An Application of Fund 9 (FEEM Working Paper No. 88.2006) (explaining that in
some scenarios, countries will be responsible for participation in the program proportional to
their coal use).
267.
See Burtraw et al., supra note 267, at iv (discussing the difficulty in choosing an
environmental policy in a cost-effective manner in the face of the constraints that Congress
faces).
268.
See id. at xi (suggesting that regardless of the type of legislation that Congress
ultimately implements, it should make a statement to the effect that all provisions are drafted
with the goal of environmental protection).
269.
See Tol, supra note 266, at 6 (proposing different scenarios that would take into
account the amount in which a nation contributed to climate change).
270.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 39 (discussing the untested nature of
carbon tax programs and cap-and trade-programs).
271.
See id. (stating that the results of these programs are essentially hypothetical).
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assumes that market-based implementations will provide enough incentive
for emitters to invest in and utilize new, “greener” technologies.272
Proponents of cap-and-trade believe that this incentive will lead to an
overall reduction in carbon emissions.273 On the other hand, carbon taxation
is designed on the theory that by increasing the cost of carbon production
throughout the chain of distribution, the use of carbon intensive products
will be less desirable and the public will be prompted to purchase items
with a lower carbon intensity or usage.274 Estimates and educated guesses
as to the effect of any particular program’s efficiency in lowering GHG
emissions jeopardizes the credibility of the approach as a whole, and may
jeopardize the environment as well.
IV. Carbon Tax With Reinvestment
A. All Consumers Pay Under Carbon Tax with Reinvestment
As I have previously argued, neither cap-and-trade nor carbon
taxation are capable of reducing GHG emissions with any concrete
certainty.275 If the EU and other nations are to have a resonant impact on
carbon emissions in the future, it is imperative that the system approaches
lowering GHG emissions aggressively. The EU-ETS has shown that
without a program that will approach lowering carbon emissions with
certainty; it may prove difficult to achieve the emissions reductions nations
are hoping to achieve.276 To ensure a decrease in emissions, new legislation
must look to regulate all emitters, not just a certain subset.277 A better
alternative is the carbon tax with reinvestment approach.278 A carbon tax
with reinvestment is unique in that it directly targets all carbon consumers
and taxes them through a downstream strategy.279 Uniquely, a carbon tax
with reinvestment looks to incorporate the societal costs of GHG emissions
272.
See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 72, at 11 (arguing that utilities will spend money
on further abatement measures).
273.
See id. at 3–4 (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of a cap-and trade-ystem).
274.
See Waggoner, supra note 188, at 1260–61 (stating that cap-and-trade programs
will behave like a sales tax, and have the same effect on consumers as any regressive tax).
275.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 609 (explaining that there is no certainty that
implementing a cap-and-trade or carbon tax policy will result in real reductions of GHG
emissions, particularly ones that the economy can afford).
276.
See id. at 593 (discussing the many problems the EU-ETS had during its first
trading period).
277.
See id. at 609 (proposing that a new regulation must include all emitters and
guarantee real reductions in carbon emissions).
278.
See id. at 610 (discussing a carbon tax with reinvestment policy and its
effectiveness).
279.
See id. (analyzing the carbon tax with reinvestment strategy).
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and promote emissions reductions.280 The most obvious difference with this
program is the reinvestment piece, which will work to nullify any doubt
that the proposal will achieve the goals of benefitting society through
environmental and health implications.281 The monetary payment acts as a
payoff of the environmental costs imposed from the destructive emission of
carbon, and it serves to send an undeniable message about how serious
curbing GHG emissions will be taken.282 Constructing environmentally
friendly energy production facilities will only further the message that the
tax itself sends.
B. The Basics of Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (CTR)
One of the most striking aspects of carbon tax with reinvestment is
its simplicity. For example, the tax could be initially set at five dollars per
ton of carbon contained within the product based on emissions intensity.283
The tax can be assessed either at the source or at the border on the good or
service based on the emission’s intensity (GPD/ton of CO2), with the tax
eventually paid by the consumer, as is always the case for a carbon tax or
cap-and-trade.284 Because everyone is an emitter based on carbon intensity,
no one is exempt from the tax.285 Following an implementation period, the
tax rate increases systematically and provides certainty to industries and
consumers for investment and planning purposes.286 Despite an analysis
remarking on the ability of increasing taxes to reduce future emissions, the
carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on the public option to reduce
carbon emissions.287 Unlike cap-and-trade and a carbon tax, the carbon tax
with reinvestment is not linked to the merely possible acquiescence of the
280.
See id. (“This carbon tax with reinvestment would directly tax all carbon emitters
through a downstream approach, as opposed to cap-and-trade’s limited upstream proposals.
This tax accounts for the societal costs of carbon emissions, and through this accountability
promotes emission reductions just like cap-and-trade.”).
281.
See id. at 616 (explaining that the effective emission reductions would mitigate
negative environmental and social health impacts of climate change).
282.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that the goal of the CTR is to refund
monies collected over a long period of time through cheaper and cleaner energy).
283.
See id. (“For the base model, the assumption is that the CTR would start in year 1
at $5/ton.”).
284.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 591 (explaining the cost-shifting occurrence after the
CTR is implemented).
285.
See id. at 619 (discussing how the downstream tax works and stating that no one
will be exempted from the tax).
286.
See id. at 610 (explaining that every year the tax rate increases by $5 per ton of
carbon).
287.
See id. (“Despite an analysis remarking on the ability of increasing taxes to reduce
future-and short-term emissions, the carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on a public
option to reduce GHG emissions.”).
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power sector to adopt greener means of production.288 The revenue from the
taxation will be funneled into building new infrastructure for energy
production.289 Wind, geothermal, nuclear, and solar facilities and other
renewable and clean sources of power are built, taking the place of power
plants that rely on carbon-emitting processes.290 This alleviates the need to
provide other incentives such as tax credits or incentives to develop and
build these industries.
Further, because the revenue for the construction of these facilities
will come from the tax implemented by the program, there will be no
disadvantages for utility providers, because they will not bear the burden of
paying for building new plants.291 Perhaps even more significantly, there
will be no loss of jobs or production.292 The investment in new
infrastructure will actually create new jobs, estimated at over 600,000 jobs
for construction and over 2.5 million direct, indirect, and induced jobs for
the EU.293 By transforming old power installations into new low-to-no
emissions facilities, the carbon tax with reinvestment program will more
quickly force emissions down without having to rely on market forces.294
Strategically, this tax is designed to be phased out over time.295 Although
the tax rate rises from five dollars to fifty dollars per ton over a ten-year
288.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (discussing how the CTR would motivate
industry to purchase energy-efficient machinery).
289.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 610 (discussing how the revenue from the tax will
be used to build new, low emission infrastructure for energy production).
290.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 146 (determining that the amount of infrastructure is
contingent on the means of energy production).
291.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 611 (“There will be no added expense for the
utilities, as they will not be the ones bearing the cost of construction, and neither jobs nor
production will be lost.”).
292.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 148 (explaining that both political parties will support
CTR because it actually creates a significant number of jobs).
293.
See generally ROBERT BACON & MASAMI KOJIMA, THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES IN
ESTIMATING THE EMPLOYMENT GENERATED BY ENERGY SECTOR ACTIVITIES (2011), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/Measuring_the_employment_
impact_of_energy_sector1.pdf (using carbon tax revenues to calculate direct, indirect, and
induced jobs, and calculating total jobs from those data sets) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROLE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO GROWTH AND JOBS IN THE EU FOR TIME
HORIZON
2020-2050
(undated),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/opportunities/doc/opportunities/2012_04_04/socio
economic_role_nuclear_2020_2050_final.pdf (calculating increased employment from
nuclear energy production) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
294.
See infra Figs. 6 & 7 (showing how an implemented carbon taxation with
reinvestment plan would lower emissions substantially over time).
295.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 588 (showing how the proposal creates a system that
gradually decreases the tax over time).
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period, there is a peak in total tax in the tenth year, followed by a rapidly
declining period of tax collection as a percentage of the economy.296 This
occurs, as shown in Figure 1, because as new power plants replace older
power plants the level of emissions declines significantly.297 Figure 1 is the
flow chart to explain how funds are collected and used. The model is based
on all GHG emissions being taxed. The taxes raised are used to order and
construct new power plants.298 These power plants, once on line, replace
existing power plant infrastructure.299 Replacing existing power plants
reduces emissions, resulting in future lower tax revenues.300
Figure 1: Model Flow Chart301

In twenty years, EU countries or the U.S., slower growing
developed countries, can achieve a thirty-eight to seventy-four percent

296.
See id. at 623 (describing the tax structure).
297.
See id. at 611 (discussing how replacing power plants will reduce emissions
significantly).
298.
See id. at 610 (explaining that the tax will be funneled to constructing new power
plants).
299.
See id. at 611 (discussing how current power plants will be replaced by nuclear,
geothermal, solar, and wind facilities, among others).
300.
See id. (explaining how the new infrastructure will emit less carbon, causing less
carbon tax to be collected).
301.
Unless otherwise noted, all figures appearing in this article were created by the
author for his dissertation: Carbon and Energy: The Limitations of Utility and Building
Infrastructure (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
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reduction in GHG emissions in the building and utilities sector.302 The
benefits afforded to all nations or unions that adopt the carbon tax with
reinvestment are substantial.303 As dirty, expensive energy is eventually
replaced with energy that is clean and inexpensive, nations will have
adopted highly energy-efficient devices.304
The tax begins simply enough at five dollars per ton of CO2 and
increases by five dollars per ton each year until the tax reaches fifty dollars
per ton in year ten.305 Figures 2 and 3 show the economic impact of this tax
based on revenues raised from that tax as a percentage of the EU and U.S.
economies. The tax peaks at 1.84% for the EU-27 and 2.49% for the United
States. It peaks higher in the U.S. because the U.S. is more carbon-intensive
(using more fossil fuels) than the EU.306

302.
See infra Figs. 6 & 7.
303.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (highlighting the benefits of switching from dirty
to clean energy).
304.
See id. (analyzing the switch from dirty to clean energy).
305.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 611 (discussing the carbon tax with reinvestment
model).
306.
See id. at 595 (explaining that the United States has higher regional carbon
emission intensities).
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Figure 2: Estimated Revenues from CTR as a percentage of the EU-27 GDP
(2013–2032)307
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307.
Revenues are calculated at five dollars per ton of GHG emissions in year one,
rising by five dollars per ton each year until the carbon tax rate reaches fifty-dollars per ton
in year ten. All goods and services, domestic and imported, are taxed based on emissions
intensity.
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Figure 3: Estimated Revenues from CTR as a percentage of the U.S. GDP
(2013–2032)
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The revenues from the CTR are used to order clean power plants to
replace existing power plants.308 This reinvestment results in significant
new power plants construction, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4
shows the purchases in the EU and Figure 5 those in the United States.

308.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 621 (showing a figure displaying power plant
construction funded by revenues from the CTR).
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Figure 4: EU-27 Power Plant Purchases (Annual and Cumulative) in
MWe309
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309.
Figures 4 and 5 indicate the amount of power plants purchased and constructed
each year in Megawatts of capacity.
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Figure 5: U.S. Power Plant Purchases and Deliveries (Annual and
Cumulative) in MWe310
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These power plant purchases and replacements produce real
emissions benefits. While I have modeled multiple scenarios, I present
these as intermediate, conservative results.

310.
The construction line trails orders indicating that a plant ordered needs to be
constructed, which takes a significant amount of time. While not calculated, every billion
dollars in construction expenditure creates approximately 25,000 direct and indirect jobs,
thus creating potentially a valuable stimulus to the economy.
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Figure 6: EU-27 Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are
Completed311
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This figure shows the impact of replacing high emission power plants with low
emission power plants. For the EU-27 total emissions decline by forty-eight percent, and by
sixty-three percent for buildings and utilities as power plants are completed. This case, using
an eight-two-three scenario, implies that it will take eight, two and three years to order,
construct, permit and bring online nuclear, solar/wind and geothermal power plant among
others. In general, results can be much better for quicker permitting periods and lower for
longer permitting periods.
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Figure 7: U.S. Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are Completed312
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C. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Complies with International Law
It is important to recognize and consider the potential difficulties
that arise under international trade law when attempting to mitigate climate
change, particularly through a cap-and-trade program. As previously
argued313 in relation to the United States, this proposal to implement a
carbon tax with reinvestment is in compliance with international law.314
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade
Organization (GATT/WTO) framework, nations have three important
obligations. First, they must adhere to the most favored nation (MFN)
principle.315 This requires that all like products be treated the same between

312.
For the U.S., the results are forty-seven percent for total emissions and sixty-seven
percent for buildings and utilities. The results are improved for buildings and utilities since
the U.S. relies more heavily on coal; however, total results are less since the U.S. relies more
heavily on oil for transportation.
313.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 615–17 (arguing that a carbon tax with reinvestment
complies with international trade law).
314.
See id. (placing the implementation of a carbon tax in the context of international
trade obligations of the United States).
315.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, III, XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196–98, 204–06, 224–26 [hereinafter GATT] (describing the three
main obligations of the treaty).
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countries.316 The foreign products are not to be treated any less favorably
than national products under the National Treatment principle.317 Third, and
most relevant to cap-and-trade, is the prohibition on quantitative
restrictions.318 This prohibition prevents countries from issuing any
embargoes, quotas, or licensing schemes on both imported and exported
products.319
A carbon tax with reinvestment, however, does not suffer from
these problems.320 Each country and company is subject to the same
treatment for the same conduct.321 There is no restriction or additional tariff
on imported and exported goods.322 Therefore, this proposal finds a
common ground between international trade law and the international goal
of mitigating climate change.
The effectiveness of a carbon tax with reinvestment on the
international level could benefit the European Union in several ways.323
First, effective emission reductions would mitigate the negative
environmental, social, and health impacts of climate change.324 Second, the
tax would encourage economic advancements through infrastructure
development and job creation.325 Finally, the international effects resulting
from the carbon tax with reinvestment would assist the European Union in
maintaining its standing as a world leader.326
316.
See id. at 196–98 (introducing the most favored nation principle, which states that
any advantage given to one product must be accorded to any similar product originating
from any territory).
317.
See id. at 204–06 (stating that the national treatment principle, which states that
any imported products must not face taxes that are not applied to products of national
origin).
318.
See id. at 224–26 (outlining the restriction on quantitative restrictions).
319.
See id. (stating that no party to the treaty shall use quotas, import, or export
licenses on imports from other territories); see also Erik B. Bartenhagen, The Intersection of
Trade and the Environment: An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on
Ecolabeling Programs, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 60 (1997) (explaining that the prohibition on
quantitative restrictions “prevents member countries from using quotas, embargoes, or
licensing schemes on imported or exported products”).
320.
See Sewalk, supra note 79 at 615–17 (discussing the advantages of a carbon tax
over cap-and-trade in the context of international trade law).
321.
See id. (noting the technical aspects of a carbon tax).
322.
See id. (stating that because a carbon tax is neutral to producers, it does not create
impermissible tariffs).
323.
See Young, supra note 191, at 1389 (explaining the potential benefits of a carbon
emissions reduction policy).
324.
See id. at 1388 (suggesting that a global emissions reduction policy would help
mitigate “significant losses in agriculture and health”).
325.
See id. at 1389 (arguing that a global emissions reduction policy would propel a
country’s economic position).
326.
See id. (suggesting that the United States, if it had implemented an emissions
reduction policy, could “uphold its standing as a world leader”).
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V. The EU Should Adopt Carbon Tax With Reinvestment in Place of the
Current ETS Program
A. Benefits to the EU
If the EU were to drop the failing ETS program, it would not only
reap the benefits of climate legislation that is simple to implement and both
environmentally and economically efficient, it would also effectively usher
in a new age of climate change policy around the world. Adopting a carbon
tax with reinvestment approach would still allow Europe to uphold
previously enforced tenements from the cap-and-trade scheme, but also
enable the legislation to be much more flexible in response to price changes
and volatility induced by external pressures.327 Also, the revenue generated
from the tax could immediately be utilized to construct new low-carbon
emitting energy facilities.328 One of the major critiques regarding the EUETS is that for all the money that it took to enact and maintain the reduction
strategy, the EU could have had a greater impact if they had instead focused
on funding building new “green” infrastructure.329 The carbon tax with
reinvestment solves that problem by both benefitting from the lesser cost of
implementation that would be inherent in a carbon tax approach, and by
channeling money toward the building of cleaner energy sources.330 Carbon
tax with reinvestment represents the quickest way that the EU could begin
to cut down on GHG emissions because the revenue will be available as
soon as the program is underway.331 Adopting the program would also
guarantee that energy prices throughout Europe would fall as alternative
energy projects continue to be built at no cost to the utilities.332
A carbon tax with reinvestment is a designedly streamlined
approach to ensure feasibility and effectiveness.333 Starting a CTR at five
dollars per ton of CO2334 and then increasing the level each year until it
327.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 606 (explaining that enforcing a carbon tax would
only require use of current agencies and their existing staffs).
328.
See id. at 607 (stating that the revenue generated from a carbon tax could be
returned to the public or be used for other means).
329.
See Maher, supra note 133 (describing the main criticisms of the EU-ETS).
330.
See supra Fig. 2 (showing the amount of revenue the EU would collect as a
percentage of its GDP if it were to switch to a CTR approach).
331.
See Maher, supra note 133 (explaining that carbon pricing would be the cheapest
and most efficient way to cut GHG emissions).
332.
See id. (explaining that one of the biggest problems with the current emissions
trading system is the fluctuation of energy prices).
333.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 609 (suggesting that a carbon tax would be simple,
feasible, and extremely effective).
334.
See id. at 610 (discussing the mechanics of a carbon tax with reinvestment
proposal).
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reaches a peak of fifty dollars per ton335 would provide market certainty,
while allowing the construction and materials sectors to build capacity to
avoid demand-induced inflation.336 The revenues from the tax would peak,
and then decline rapidly as the emissions decline due to the adoption of
cleaner energy sources.337 The tax could be administered under the
European Commission because it will utilize the same tax-monitoring
techniques that the EU has had in place for years.338
The European economy is increasingly becoming dependent on
energy and infrastructure.339 With reinvestment of the revenues from a
carbon tax, countries in the EU would stimulate their economies, creating
jobs for their citizens, while lowering GHG emissions. Most carbon tax
schemes are not capable of being “benefit certain,” because there can be no
sound guarantee that the tax will encourage emitters to invest in cleaner
technology.340 A carbon tax with reinvestment, however, does not stake its
effectiveness on the ability or will of the utilities, industry and public to
adopt new technologies to reduce carbon emissions.341 Rather, the CTR
adopts the latest technologies in tried-and-true fields, relying on investment
from the tax revenue to develop and construct cleaner alternative energy
power plants to lower GHG emissions.342 Previous debates between capand-trade proponents and carbon taxation proponents have always boiled
down to deciding whether “cost certainty” or “benefit certainty” was the
more desirable attribute of a carbon emissions reduction program.343
Carbon taxation with reinvestment is able to provide both “certainties,” and
is therefore the most effective approach to actually reduce GHG
335.
See id. (explaining the graduated steps that would be used to increase the tax on
carbon emissions).
336.
See id. at 617 (arguing that a carbon tax is the best approach, in part because it
would provide cost certainty and price stability).
337.
See id. at 611 (explaining that tax revenues will initially rise and then over time the
revenues will decrease because new non-emitting energy facilities will not face a carbon
tax).
338.
See id. at 606 (stating that while cap-and-trade imposes high costs and difficulties
with monitoring, a carbon tax could utilize the same monitoring techniques already in place).
339.
See David Victor & Linda Yueh, The New Energy Order: Managing Insecurities
in the Twenty-first Century, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 61, 61 (2010) (noting that Europe is dependent
on energy and is concerned about its energy security).
340.
See Mann, supra note 202, at 45 (explaining that one of the main disadvantages of
a carbon tax system is that it does not set carbon reduction targets and thus results in
uncertain emissions).
341.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 613 (stating that a carbon tax with reinvestment does
not rely on public accountability to reduce carbon emission).
342.
See id. at 610 (noting that carbon tax reinvestment takes tax revenue and uses it to
build new infrastructure for energy production).
343.
See id. at 613–14 (explaining that until now, one had to choose either “cost
certainty” or “benefit certainty” when picking an emissions reduction system).
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emissions.344 The EU should not continue losing money while having little
impact on lowering carbon emissions utilizing the ETS cap-and-trade
program, and should switch to a carbon tax with reinvestment approach to
ensure a cost-effective and efficient reduction in carbon emissions.345
B. Autonomy and Fairness Among Nations
Not only would carbon tax with reinvestment make more
environmental sense than the current EU-ETS program, it is also more
malleable, allowing it to better serve each European nation’s particular
needs. In the cap-and-trade system, the cap is set and remains rigid while
the price of allowances fluctuates according to demand from emitters.346
This style of carbon emission legislation has proven difficult to apply to an
area as diverse as Europe.347 Each country in the EU has its own needs from
a climate change initiative according to its current energy infrastructure and
economy.348 Germany relies more heavily on coal and Russian gas, while
France uses more nuclear power, and Denmark has invested heavily in
significant wind power capacity.349 Each country has its own challenges,
and the CTR would allow each country to set up its own priorities for
reinvestment to rid itself of the highest carbon emission power plants.350
344.
See id. (noting that a carbon tax with reinvestment can provide both “cost
certainty” and “benefit certainty”).
345.
See id. at 609–10 (explaining that there is no data to suggest that cap-and-trade is
actually reducing emissions, and a more effective and efficient market-based approach is a
carbon tax with reinvestment).
346.
See Nell & Rezai, supra note 82, at 8 (“Enforcement of the cap is difficult and
trading of emission certificates are exposed to speculative investments, generating a high
volatility of the carbon price as the European example shows.”).
347.
See COELHO, supra note 63, at 3 (noting that the “collective target [for emission
reduction] was translated into differentiated national emissions targets for each Member
State according to the ‘burden-sharing’ agreement”).
348.
See id. (“Each Member State however is responsible for their Kyoto targets, which
cover other sectors, either by reducing emissions at source or by buying credits from offset
projects.”).
349.
See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 2013 11,
15
(2013),
available
at
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/
publication/KeyWorld2013.pdf (providing data regarding Germany’s reliance on imported
natural gas and production of coal for consumption) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see id. at 17 (noting that France is
the second highest consumer of nuclear energy in the world); see also Wind Energy,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF DENMARK, http://denmark.dk/en/green-living/wind-energy/ (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (stating that twenty-eight percent of the electricity supply in the
country is from wind power) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
350.
See Young, supra note 191, at 1391–94 (describing the flexibility of a carbon tax
and arguing that it could be “evaluated periodically and adjusted”).
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Carbon taxation with reinvestment is flexible enough to allow each
country in the program to maintain autonomy and receive equal benefit
according to its need.351 Each country that participates in the carbon tax
with reinvestment approach would have its own tax rates, and each country
would collect its own share of taxes to rebuild its power facilities.352 In
essence, thirty-one different carbon tax rates would operate in the EU under
this approach.353
Another important measure that can be implemented within the
framework of a carbon tax with reinvestment approach is border tax
adjustments.354 These adjustments are designed to create a fairer playing
field between domestic producers who are faced with constraints on their
GHG emissions and foreign competitors who have no such restrictions.355
This strategy has been proposed under the EU-ETS to help European
nations compete with other countries like the U.S. and China.356 Countries
operating without climate change mitigation have an economic advantage
because they are typically able to offer lower prices because they are not
being taxed or punished for their carbon output.357 If border tax adjustments
were implemented with carbon taxation with reinvestment, it would serve
to strengthen each country’s ability to enjoy autonomy while cooperating
fairly in the program.358

351.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 584 (explaining that an EU-wide tax proposal was
unpopular because member nations considered it an affront to their sovereign tax power).
352.
See id. at 582 (“The tax is structured so that there is no incentive to invest in
production in non-compliant regions.”).
353.
See id. (examining alternatives to cap-and-trade regimes that might provide more
incentive for each country to reduce carbon emissions).
354.
See generally Stéphanie Monjon & Philippe Quirion, Addressing Leakage in the
EU ETS: Border Adjustment of Output-Based Allocation? 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1957
(2011) (examining the competitiveness problems with the EU cap-and-trade system and
border tax adjustments as a response).
355.
See id. at 1958 (explaining that border adjustments are a “trade measure designed
to level the playing field between domestic producers facing costly climate policy and
foreign producers with no or little constraint on their GHG emissions”).
356.
See id. at 1957 (noting a recent EU Directive that mentions border adjustments as
a possible solution to the problem of carbon leakage).
357.
See id. at 1958 (“[T]he EU ETS increases the production cost of European
producers in GHG intensive sectors, some of which are exposed to international
competition.”).
358.
See id. at 1970 (discussing certain European countries and suggesting that “a
border adjustment covering only imports may be easier to negotiate because it generates
public revenues, which may be redistributed to exporting countries”).
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C. An Example to the U.S. and the World
GHG emissions are unlike many other regulated articles as they are
not stationary, so their damaging effects are not limited to any particular
region.359 Carbon emissions travel around the Earth’s atmosphere and create
the “global” climate change issue we know today.360 This phenomenon
clearly implies that tackling the issue of global climate change must be a
unified endeavor among nation states and unions of nations.361 If nations
around the world are unwilling to adopt climate change regulation and take
serious steps to mitigate their carbon emissions, the concentration of these
harmful gases in the atmosphere could rise to twice the level of preindustrialized levels before the end of the century.362 Many proponents of
climate change policy viewed the Kyoto Protocol as the tool that would
create cohesion among nations to address climate change holistically.363
The Kyoto Protocol was an international treaty that set regulations on
industrialized countries to attempt to curb GHG emissions.364 There has not
been an international effort to rally around the Kyoto Protocol in the way
that many climate scientists hoped.365 This only further strengthens the
argument that the world desperately needs a new plan and direction, one
that actually works, to unify the world in the joint effort of lowering GHG
emissions.

359.
See Hans Gersbach & Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Developing Countries,
1 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8685, 2011) (explaining how
“greenhouse gases travel around the world”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
360.
See id. (noting the emissions burden carried by developing countries around the
world).
361.
See Johnathon H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation
to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“Without concerted
efforts by nearly all industrialized and industrializing nations to drastically reduce net
greenhouse gas . . . emissions, atmospheric concentrations will likely grow to double those
of pre-industrial levels before century’s end.”).
362.
See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 37 (describing the changes in
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gas emissions).
363.
See Christina Figueres, Environmental Issues: Time to Abandon Blame-Games and
Become
Proactive,
THE ECON. TIMES
(Dec.
15,
2012,
5:51
AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-15/news/35836633_1_emissionreduction-targets-global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-climate-change (detailing how the Kyoto
Protocol was initially seen as a rallying cry for nations of the world) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
364.
See id. (describing the commitment of thirty-seven countries to reduce emissions
to levels below their 1990 levels).
365.
See id. (“Governments are driving change, but have not yet proven their intent
through a robust and immediate implementation of what has already been promised.”).
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If the EU were to abandon the ETS system, which has done little to
advance the lowering of carbon emissions toward a level that is required to
limit global climate change, and adopt a carbon tax with reinvestment, it
could likely produce a chain reaction with other countries following suit.
One country keeping a close eye on EU policies on climate change is the
U.S.366 A carbon taxation system would also be the best approach for the
U.S., but many legislators still lean toward cap-and-trade-type programs to
address climate change.367 It would likely be foolish to follow the EU down
the path of market-based carbon emissions regulation given the ETS’s
checkered record.368 The U.S. has had extensive experience working within
the framework of an economy-wide excise tax.369 Setting up a new cap-andtrade-based program would not only be very difficult to draft, it would
likely take years to implement, which is more time wasted battling against
global climate change.370 A carbon tax with reinvestment would be
comparatively easy to enact because it fits into already-existing tax laws.371
Many climate change scientists believe that governments have already
waited too long to initiate climate change measures.372 More time equates to
a greater harm to the environment due to GHG emissions.373 As Figure 7
showed, significant emissions reductions are possible in the U.S.
The very same benefits that will be realized by countries in the EU
would be realized by states in the U.S. if it were to adopt a carbon tax with
reinvestment program.374 The U.S., like Europe, would see an immediate
366.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 618 (discussing the U.S. observation of Europe’s
cap-and-trade initiative).
367.
See Bruce McClain & Heidi Meier, The U.S. Cap and Trade Initiative: Current
Status and Potential Impact on Business, 28 AM. J. OF BUSINESS 1, 13 (2013) (displaying
recent cap-and-trade legislation in the United States and its support in Congress).
368.
See generally George Daskalakis & Raphael Markellos, Are the European Carbon
Markets Efficient?, 17 REV. OF FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (discussing the potential for
inefficiencies in the European cap-and-trade system because the carbon allowances do not
reflect all available information).
369.
See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 618 (arguing that a carbon tax, utilizing existing
excise tax laws, could be quickly enacted).
370.
See Zhang, supra note 107, at 1805 (discussing the complex arrangement and
initiation of the European ETS scheme).
371.
See Young, supra note 191, at 1394 (stating that a carbon tax would be “relatively
simple to fit into our current tax system” even though it “may require a substantial
reconstruction of the environmental and energy sections in the tax code”).
372.
See Craig, supra note 6, at 6 (“American law and policy are not keeping up with
climate change impacts and the need for adaptation.”).
373.
See id. at 12 (“[W]ithout mitigation efforts, mass destruction of both natural
systems and human societies becomes an increasingly likely eventuality.”).
374.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (“[T]he goal of the [carbon tax with
reinvestment] is to potentially refund monies collected over a longer time period through
cheaper and cleaner energy.”).
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influx of revenue from the approach that would be utilized to change the
highest carbon emitting facilities into low-to-no-carbon emitting
facilities.375 And the benefits in terms of economic stimulus and clean
energy self-sufficiency would be significant, benefiting the whole world.376
States in the U.S. would also reap benefits of new energy facilities, which
would not cost them anything.377 This means an influx of jobs for the
construction of the new low carbon emitting facilities and for the operation
and maintenance of those facilities.378 Also, just as citizens in European
countries would soon be paying much less for energy under a carbon tax
with reinvestment approach, so too would citizens of the U.S.379 Not only
would the U.S. be embarking on a new era of providing clean and
renewable energy options to its citizens at a lower price, but it would be
creating jobs throughout the country and it would be reducing the high
levels of carbon emissions that it has produced for generations.
An implemented carbon tax with reinvestment strategy in Europe
would put pressure on other nations to adopt stricter GHG emission
measures.380 The carbon leakage that has proven to be an issue in the
current EU-ETS strategy would be nullified by a CTR’s ability to tax all
products at a rate according to carbon intensity.381 This amount would be
determined by the total emissions in an economy or region, divided by the
GDP of that economy or region, and easily calculated by summing the
grams of carbon dioxide released per mega joule of energy produced, or the
ratio of greenhouse gas emissions produced to GDP.382 This strategy creates
an equitable trading system between nations, and nullifies the threat of the
375.
See id. at 142 (noting that the program would provide a “revenue stream based on
a carbon tax that replaces the existing power infrastructure, thereby reducing total
emissions”).
376.
See Adler, supra note 361 and accompanying text.
377.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that “[a]s new power plants are
constructed using . . . funds (collected from taxpayers) and transferred to PUCs and utilities,
the total capital invested by the utility over time is lowered, thereby resulting in lower
electricity prices”).
378.
See id. at 148 (“[I]t produces more secure energy future and environmental future
and creates a significant number of jobs.”).
379.
See Young, supra note 191, at 1379 (discussing the aspects of a carbon tax that
would discourage energy companies from passing increased costs to consumers).
380.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 44 (“A carbon tax sends a clear
signal to polluters: pollution imposes a negative externality on others, and you should be
forced to internalize that cost by paying the tax.”).
381.
See id. at 32 (“The tax rate would . . . reflect the increase in the harmful effects of
carbon dioxide emissions. A carbon tax thereby would provide a price signal that
captures . . . the harmful effects of carbon dioxide emissions.”).
382.
See Wojciech Budzianowski, Target for National Carbon Intensity of Energy by
2050: A Case Study of Poland’s Energy System, 46 ENERGY 575, 576–77 (2012) (explaining
the methodology for determining carbon intensity).
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EU being undermined by carbon leakage to other markets.383 Taken a step
further, taxing imports by their carbon intensity creates a powerful
incentive for EU trading partners to adopt emissions strategies as well.384
Table 1 compares emissions intensity for several U.S. states and different
EU and World countries.
Table 1: Emissions Intensity, Comparing U.S. States vs. Select Countries385
Emissions Intensities: U.S. States vs. Select Countries
$ of GDP per Ton of CO2 Emissions
Alabama

$892.86

India

$448.43

California

$3,703.70

Japan

$3,448.28

France

$4,000.00

Washington

$2,941.18

UK

$3,571.43

Colorado

$1,886.79

Euro Area

$2,500.00

United States

$2,040.82

Australia

$1,298.70

Texas
Wyoming

$1,250.00
$305.81

China

$312.50

383.
See id. at 578 (using Poland as an example to show how carbon intensity can more
fairly capture the emissions of any country).
384.
See id. at 575 (noting that taxation by carbon intensity means “countries having
highly GHG-intensive power sectors might need deep structural and technological changes
of their energy systems”).
385.
GDP and emissions data for U.S. states provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and the World Recourses Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicator Tool
(CAIT), respectively. GDP for countries from World Bank 2012. Emission intensities
calculated by dividing GDP of the selected Nations and U.S. States by tons of GHG
emissions. This results in U.S. dollars of GDP per ton of GHG emissions, compared between
countries or states. Structuring a program in this manner avoids the World Trade
Organization challenge of method of production as global methods occur in different states
and countries.
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D. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Will Create an Influx of New Jobs
The reinvestment of an implemented carbon tax would have a
significant impact on job creation in the EU.386 First, the revenue from the
tax will be used to update old power facilities and establish new low- to noemission facilities, which will require a number of new construction jobs.387
The EU, and any other nation that adopts carbon tax with reinvestment,
could anticipate creating a minimum of 11,000 new direct construction jobs
for each billion dollars in tax created revenue.388 These jobs would create an
instant boost to any economy and functionally uplift the entire construction
industry.389 Also, after the initial construction on the facilities is finished,
additional jobs will be created for maintenance and operation of the greener
facilities.390 This ensures that there will not be a drop in long-term
employment numbers when the older facilities are retrofitted.391 Studies
have shown that the number of jobs actually increases when low- to nocarbon facilities are used instead of their higher-polluting counterparts.392
This two-pronged employment benefit allows carbon taxation with
reinvestment to have an immediate and lasting effect on economies that
implement the approach.393

386.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the benefits that the carbon tax with
reinvestment would have on employment).
387.
See id. (explaining that such revenue could be “used to build low- or no-carbonemitting power plants, including but not limited to solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric,
nuclear and other non-emitting energy sources”).
388.
See Rania Antonopoulos et al., Investing in Care: A Strategy for Effective and
Equitable Job Creation 16 (Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 610, 2011),
available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1291 (explaining that a $50
billion investment creates 556,000 construction jobs) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
389.
See id. at 16–27 (describing both direct and indirect job creation in the
construction industry).
390.
See Ulrike Lehr & Christian Lutz, Green Jobs? Economic Impacts of Renewable
Energy in Germany 7 (2011) (presented at Ecomod 2011, International Conference on
Economic Modeling, Azores, Portugal, June 29–July 1, 2011) (explaining that in 2009 in
Germany, 339,500 people worked in energy production, operation, and maintenance) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
391.
See id. at 7 (noting that the number of people employed in the operation and
maintenance industry is expected to double by 2025).
392.
See id. at 5 (“The increase of renewable energy leads in most of the scenarios
studied to positive net employment, rising steadily, particularly from 2020 onwards.”).
393.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 145 (“[T]his policy . . . provides a significant stimulus
to the construction industry, thereby stimulating the economy; . . . results in the production
of clean power sooner, thereby reducing emissions; . . . resulting in lower total taxation to
achieve the end result of reducing emissions.”).
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E. Would Reinvestment in the Cap-and-Trade System Work?

Despite its initial appeal, a cap-and-trade system that also
incorporates reinvestment simply does not work. A cap-and-trade system is
based on emission caps that are assumed to be effective maximums, but
reinvestment destroys this system by significantly reducing emissions
supply.394 While in theory a cap-and-trade program can generate as much
revenue as a carbon tax,395 it would require a very hands-off approach—
auctioning off all allowances, and providing no free permits as has been the
procedure of EU-ETS so far.396 In fact, the EU-ETS has only actually
auctioned around five percent of all the allowances it administered.397 With
the lackluster performance of the EU-ETS thus far, it is difficult to imagine
the program only auctioning off allowances in the future. The program will
probably have to continue to rely on allocating allowances in at least some
instances. This of course means less revenue for the program, and less
revenue correlates to a decreased ability to address carbon emissions.398
Thus, the ability for the EU to invest into new forms of clean energy would
not be as robust, leaving the EU again in the unenviable position of
implementing climate change legislation that is not actually promoting the
development of cleaner technologies.399

394.
See supra Part III.B.4 (describing the way in which carbon emissions will be
reduced over time if a carbon tax with reinvestment plan is adopted).
395.
See Driesen, supra note 96, at 5 (“Many regulators and scholars recognize that
auctioning enhances efficiency, avoids windfall profits, and generates revenues that
government can spend to further advance environmental or other societal goals . . . .”).
396.
See id. at 18 (explaining that the 2009 amendment made full auctioning the “basic
principle” for allocating allowances after receipt of free permits led to substantial windfall
profits for European electric utilities).
397.
See Corina Haiti, International Center for Climate Governance, Recycling the
Auction Revenue from Phases I and II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (International
Ctr. For Climate Governance Reflection No. 15/2013, 2013), available at
http://www.iccgov.org/FilePagineStatiche/Files/Publications/Reflections/15_Reflection_Mar
ch_2013.pdf (graphing the percentage of allowances auctioned during Phases I and II of the
ETS) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
398.
See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 145 (explaining that the revenue generated from the
program “results in the production of clean power sooner, thereby reducing emissions;
and . . . leads to lower emissions, resulting in lower total taxation to achieve the end result of
reducing emissions”).
399.
See Driesen, supra note 96, at 4 (“[C]ap-and-trade programs do not necessarily
deliver better environmental performance than the BAT regulations they aim to replace, a
troublesome conclusion give the seriousness of the climate disruption problem.”).
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VI. Conclusion
It is becoming ever more evident that countries around the world
need to adopt climate change policies that proactively reduce GHG
emissions. Global ecosystems are suffering what could prove to be
irreparable harm due to the inability for nations and unions of nations to
enact legislation that limits carbon emissions, which are currently wreaking
havoc on our global climate. The EU-ETS was touted as the implement that
would usher in a new era of climate change legislation that put the goals of
public health care and environmental factors in harmony with an efficiently
functioning market-based economic force. This cap-and-trade system,
however, which has (1) seen the market for carbon become inoperable, (2)
given windfall profits to certain large emitters while being overburdensome to smaller targeted emitters, and (3) failed to be effective in
curbing Europe’s carbon output, is no longer a rallying point for other
nations who are seeking to initiate climate change policies concerning GHG
emissions. The EU-ETS’s faltering has created doubt in the climate change
community, and has given climate change policy opponents one more
talking point to challenge future measures worldwide.400
A carbon taxation system with reinvestment represents the best
option for the EU at this point. Carbon taxation is uncomplicated in both
implementation and design: it offers a “cost certainty” element that is
missing in cap-and-trade programs, promises price stability to avoid the
issues that have plagued the EU-ETS, and represents a unique ability to
raise revenue for use by nations that implement the carbon taxation
approach. A carbon tax that utilizes reinvestment is even more effective
than either a carbon tax or cap-and-trade approach because it ensures that
revenue raised by the taxation is used to combat carbon emissions and
create new low-carbon or no-carbon facilities. Also, a carbon tax with
reinvestment works in a unique way to target all polluters of carbon, not
just selected emitters who fall in the targeted cap area or selected taxation
pool. To date, there has never been a climate change policy that could boast
the unique advantages that carbon tax with reinvestment is able to utilize to
ensure effectiveness.
Some policymakers argue that cap-and-trade is the best approach
for climate change legislation.401 Much of the affinity toward cap-and-trade
programs began because of successful programs in the past.402 One of the
400.
See ETS RIP?, supra note 69 (explaining that members of the European
Parliament appear ready to abandon the system entirely).
401.
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the advantages of cap-and-trade).
402.
See Driesen, supra note 96, at 13 (noting that the 1990 amendments to the Clean
Air Act inaugurated the first major successes with emissions trading).
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more prolific examples of cap-and-trade success is the U.S. acid rain
reduction measures, which were implemented in 1995.403 Many proponents
of the cap-and-trade approach to carbon emission regulation will use this
program as an example of how well cap-and-trade works.404 The acid rain
program, however, is different than most cap-and-trade programs in many
ways, most notably in that it was not economy-wide.405 Furthermore, if a
tax with reinvestment scheme had been used to reduce sulfur in the
atmosphere, it would have been more effective.
The EU-ETS is the biggest and best example of a large-scale
trading-based program designed to produce environmental impacts.406 As
illuminated above, the EU-ETS is proving that large-scale cap-and-trade
can be a very fragile system as shown in Figure 8.

403.
See id. (explaining that the acid rain trading program demonstrated that a properlydesigned trading program could be successfully implemented).
404.
See id. at 14–15 (describing the way that the acid rain cap-and-trade program
impacted the Kyoto Protocol’s formulation).
405.
See id. at 13 (explaining that Congress placed individual caps on each regulated
unit in the electricity industry).
406.
See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 19 (explaining the advantages that
the EU-ETS has over the efforts of the United States).
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Figure 8: No Certainty - EU-ETS Carbon Price (Euros / Ton) August 2008
to May 2013407

Carbon taxation with reinvestment will create a downstream tax
effect that will ensure that no one is exempt from enforcement of the
legislation. The revenue that is created by the tax will be available
immediately and the monies will be directed at creating the sincere carbon
reducing impact that has proved elusive for the EU-ETS. By constructing
low- or non-emitting power sources like wind, geothermal, nuclear, and
solar, the carbon tax with reinvestment revenue will be put to use in a very
effective way. The global environment will benefit from the new clean
energy options that will have taken the place of high carbon emitting plants.
Further, the citizens of EU countries will experience economic benefits
because they will be utilizing cheaper energy that runs from the new, more
efficient infrastructure. European countries in the program will see new
jobs spring up alongside the new power facilities, and the countries will
become examples for the rest of the world to follow. For this reason, the
successful implementation of a carbon tax with reinvestment program in the
EU has the potential to influence the world and usher in a new age of
environmentally responsible business practices that could prove fruitful for
407.
This figure details the falling price for carbon emissions from the beginning of the
EU-ETS carbon-trading program to early 2013. The figure is characterized by an overall
downward price trend, along with high fluctuations on a monthly basis.
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generations. Upon successful implementation, the EU’s trading partners
would be encouraged to adopt the CTR, thus enabling emission reductions
on a large scale, as shown in Figures 6 and 7.408 Significantly, successful
implementation of the carbon taxation and reinvestment program in the EU
would necessitate China’s adoption of a comparable program that would
help it remain competitive in the global market. The world would benefit
from reductions in total Chinese emissions, which are projected to rise to
193% of today’s levels.
Figure 9: China Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are
Completed409
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408.
See supra notes 311–312 and accompanying text.
409.
Total Chinese emissions would decline by thirteen percent from today’s levels,
while emissions from industry and buildings would decline by nineteen percent. This is in
sharp contrast to projections showing that Chinese emissions could double in the next twenty
years.

